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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Married Women Labor Supply. (December 2011) 
Xinrong Li, B.E., Beijing Jiaotong University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Li Gan 
                                  Dr. Qi Li  
 
 
One of the very interesting demographic features in the US over the last three 
decades of the 20
th
 century is the increase of the married women labor force participation 
rate. Over the same period, estimated labor supply elasticity varies substantially. This 
dissertation is to investigate the reasons behind them. 
I first study the determinants of the increase of the labor participation rate for 
married women with preschool-aged children over the last three decades of the 20th 
century. Using 5% samples of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for 
1980, 1990 and 2000, I find that the existing explanations proposed in the literature may 
only account for 9.6% increase in the 1980s and 70% decrease in the 1990s. In this paper, 
I find that the rising ratio of career type women can explain 30.33% of the growth in the 
labor force participation rate, and the change in the composition of career motivating 
career type women can at least explain 17.22% growth across cohorts. Women who have 
been working three years before their first childbearing are more likely to return to work 
after the childbearing period. The analyzing data is the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Women (NLSYW) from 1968 to 2003 and the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 (NLSY79) from 1979 to 2008.  
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This dissertation sheds some insight about a puzzle on estimated married 
women’s labor supply elasticity variation. This important puzzle (sometimes referred to 
as the Hausman puzzle) is that the estimated labor supply elasticity varies substantially 
even when similar frameworks and similar datasets are used. I study the role of budget 
sets in producing this wide range of estimates. In particular, I study the effect of the 
typical convexification approximation of the non-convex budgets, and the well-known 
Heckman critique of the lack of bunching at the kink points of budget sets in the 
Hausman model. I introduce measurement error in nonlabor income to create an 
uncertain budget constraint that no longer implies bunching at kink points. Using the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) of 1984 and 2001, I find that neither the 
convexification approximation nor using a model with random budget sets affects the 
estimates. These results demonstrate that variations in budget constraints alone do not 
explain the different estimates of labor supply elasticity. Changing the level of budget 
sets, for example by ignoring the state individual income tax, could affect the variation in 
elasticities. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
One of the very interesting demographic features in the US over the last three 
decades of the 20
th
 century is the increase of the married women labor force participation 
rate. Over the same period, the participation rate of married women with preschool-aged 
children increased more. In Chapter II, I explore which changes in the determinants of 
labor supply mostly account for the increase in participation rate. Previous literatures 
attempt several factors to explain this large observed change in female labor supply, such 
as public policy reforms to encourage working, a drop in spousal income, a decrease in 
wage-gender gap and child care cost, and an asymmetrical increase in average 
commuting time and “power couples” across urban areas. My contributions here are to 
quantify contributions of various factors in previous literatures. I find previous 
explanations may only account for 9.6% of the increasing in labor force participation rate 
of married women with preschool-aged children from 1980 to 1990.  
Chapter II argues that career type decision is an important factor to investigate. I 
introduce a new measure on career work experience and labor force participation rate, 
which is the ratio of the number of weeks worked and the total number of weeks during 
the career period and during the labor force participation period, respectively. I suggest  
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that there are two types of individuals. For one type, career women can grasp a 
professional set of skills and networking in order to return after the childbearing period, 
while for another type, non-career type women would like to be housewives. Changes in 
labor force participation rate across cohorts are driven by shifts in the composition of 
married women with preschool-aged children, while it is possible that changes are 
motivated by changes in average behavior. The women’s attitude about the female’s 
career role in the family is the key variable to influence the women’s employment 
preference. My results show that the rising of the percentage of career women can 
explain 30.33% of the growth across cohorts. Among the unexplained changes, the 
change in the composition of career motivating career type women can at least explain 
51.2%. That means it can at least explain 17.22% growth in the labor force participation 
rate across cohorts. 
My research topic in Chapter III is how different ways of calculating budget 
constraints lead to different estimates of wage elasticities in structural models.  
Wage elasticity is a very important parameter in public policy and there is a large 
literature to estimate this parameter. Economists differ in their ways. Even with the same 
framework, for example, Hausman structural model, people produce quite different 
values on wage elasticity. There are some attempts in the literature explaining and 
addressing the discrepancies in estimates, such as nonlinear or nonparametric function 
specification. But the role of budget sets in producing the wide range of estimates has not 
been studied yet. My contributions here are to study the effect of different ways of 
calculating budget constraints, typically such as convexification approximation of the 
non-convex budgets, and uncertain budget constraints.  
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Since my focus is on the former discrepancy revealed by previous literature, I 
have strictly followed their data selection. Using the PSID which is the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics, of year 1984 and 2001 to analyze non-disable married women who 
got paid (non-disable means a tax payer could not receive any disable benefit), I find that 
both the convexification approximation and random budget sets have insignificantly 
affected the estimates. However, changing the level of budget sets, for example, by 
ignoring the state individual income tax, can largely affect the variation in elasticities. 
Reasons to consider structural models to analyze labor supply elasticities is that 
federal and state individual income tax are progressive at accumulated amount of income 
level,  and the phase-out brackets in social security payments and EITC program, 
individual budget constraints are hence piecewise-linear. For example, the marginal tax 
rate is 5% when you have worked less than 10 hours per week. The marginal tax rate will 
increase to 15% if your working hours are over 10. Therefore, we are having a convex 
kink point around 10 working hours.  In the opposite case of concave kink point, the tax 
rate will decrease if the working hour increases. With the piecewise-linear budget 
constraints, the after-tax wage rate and working hours are decided simultaneously, which 
is an endogenous problem. Hausman introduces a labor supply model of utility 
maximization for individual with respect to choices about leisure and other consumption 
goods, where the price of consumption goods is normalized to be 1. Hausman structural 
model can catch the institutional features of the tax system and incorporates the fixed cost 
of holding a job. Unfortunately, the wage elasticity varies a lot. What is even more 
puzzling is studies using the same or similar data sources have reported significant 
different elasticities. Hausman uses PSID of 1975 and finds a wage effect close to zero. 
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MaCurdy uses the same data set, makes smooth the budget segments and reports a 
negative wage effect. And Trist uses PSID of 1984 and gets a positive wage effect. 
Previous literatures find the estimates of wage elasticities are sensitive to the function 
specification. The different measurement in the gross wage rate also affects the estimates. 
And there is very little work analyzing the role of budget sets.  
In Chapter III, I consider two questions on budget sets. One is previous studies are 
based on the convexified budget sets. That means the relevant region around concave 
kink points is replaced by a single convex segment to construct convex budget sets. 
However, the effect of convexification approximation is unknown, both theoretically and 
empirically. Intuitively, if leisure and consumption are near perfect substitutes, a minor 
difference in the convexification approximation will cause a large change in hours of 
work. I have investigated the effect of convexification approximation on the labor supply 
elasticities under both convexified and non-convexified budget sets.  
The second question I consider in this chapter is Heckman critique. The basic 
assumption of Hausman structural model is that there is bunching around the kink points. 
In reality, few of tax payers bunch at the kink points of the US income tax schedule. 
Heckman concludes budget segments aren’t able to be accurately measured in most cases 
because econometricians do not know the amount of tax payers’ itemized deduction. To 
address Heckman’s critique, I introduce measurement error in nonlabor income. Such 
measurement error naturally shifts the intercept on the vertical axis of the budget 
constraints and changes the location of the kink points of the budget constraints. The 
slope of the budget sets is uncertain, which is in line with Heckman’s comments.  
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I start with a linear specification of the demand function first, and then recover the 
indirect utility function using Roy’s identity. When a person is at a kink point, the 
indifference curve is not tangent to the budget sets, the utility level can only be obtained 
from the direct utility function. If both the piecewise-linear budget constraints and the 
utility curve are convex, the unique tangent/joint point is global optimization point 
because of weak axiom of revealed preference. But the econometrician can’t assign the 
worker to a particular segment or kink point because of the individual heterogeneity 
preference. The probability can be computed by integrating out the heterogeneity 
preference error term. Then I program maximum likelihood method to estimate. Given 
the piecewise-linear budget constraints are non-convex, and a utility curve is tangent to a 
particular segment, after shifting this utility curve, it can be tangent to another segment or 
joint to another kink points. Therefore, after comparing the utility value I can be pretty 
sure which point is the global optimization point. It is impossible to use previous 
optimization trick here due to unable to get a range of heterogeneity preference error 
term. The much more complicated simulated maximum likelihood method will be used to 
solve this issue, which has randomly drawn the error term 1000 times. In addition, for 
calculating the score vector and information matrix, I introduce a kernel function to let 
likelihood function be continuous and differentiable. I apply my method to estimate the 
labor supply for married women ages 25 to 55 using the PSID data of 1984 and 2001. 
The U.S. individual income tax systems in 1983 and 2000 are used to construct non-
convexified budget constraints. The tax system includes federal income tax, state income 
tax, social security, Medicare payments, and the EITC. Previous studies average the state 
tax rates over the segments created by the federal tax. I construct more precisely budget 
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constraints by adding additional segments to the federal budget constraints. And because 
of the itemized deduction, the marginal tax rate and the corresponding changes of the 
effective taxable incomes need to be re-calculated using a self-derived formula. 
The relative difference of elasticity under random and nonconvexified budget sets 
is about 20% in 1983 and 10% in 2000. The relative difference of elasticity under 
convexified and nonconvexified budget sets is about 10% in 1983 and 2000, respectively. 
Consequently, the variation in budget sets does not explain the different estimates of 
labor supply elasticity. If the state individual tax is excluded to construct budget sets, 
there will be a large bias in the level of budget constraints which causes about 30 to 50% 
relative difference of wage elasticity. 
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CHAPTER II  
CAREER WORK EXPERIENCE BEFORE THE FIRST BIRTH AND CHANGES IN 
LABOR SUPPLY OF MARRIED WOMEN WITH PRESCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN 
2.1 Introduction 
Women’s labor force participation rate has increased dramatically over the last 
three decades of the 20th century, especially for married females with preschool-aged 
children. From 1970 to 1996, the percentage of women in the labor market rose from 
43.3% to 59.3%. Over the same period, the participation rate of married women with 
preschool-aged children was more than doubled, from 30.3% to 62.7%. The goal of this 
chapter is to explore the potential economic explanations accounting for this observed 
increase trend of labor supply in married women. 
The previous research suggests several factors to explain the large observed 
change in female labor supply. These factors include public policy reforms to encourage 
working, a drop in spousal income, a decrease in wage-gender gap and child care cost, 
and an asymmetrical increase in average commuting time and “power couples” across 
urban areas. Using 5% samples of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 
for 1980, 1990 and 2000, I find previous explanations may only account for 9.6% of the 
increasing in labor force participation rate of married women with preschool-aged 
children from 1980 to 1990. 
It has been documented that the largest increase in labor supply participation rate 
is in the group of married women with preschool-aged children. To understand the 
reasons for the change of the labor supply behavior for this group of women, I focus their 
behavior before the first child.  In this chapter, I introduce a new measure of career work 
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experience and define the career women to estimate the labor supply participation model. 
The increase ratio of career women is able to explain 30.33% of the growth in female 
labor supply participation across cohorts, cohorts that are born in 1943-53 and in 1957-
64. And the change in the composition of career motivating career type women can at 
least explain 17.22% growth across cohorts.   
Section 2.2 goes through the economic forces which might as well serve as 
potential explanations for the observed increase rate. Only 30.88% of the increasing rate 
in the 1980s is able to be explained by using 5% samples of IPUMS for 1980, 1990 and 
2000. Section 2.3 contains the primary economic contribution of this chapter. A new 
variable is introduced to measure the heterogeneity of female’s career work experience. I 
examine how the career work experience before the first child affects female’s labor 
force participation and predict how much growth of participation rate is from the change 
of measured factors. I also have a discussion about the phenomenon that more women are 
becoming the career type in the latter cohort. Finally, the conclusion is in Section 2.4.  
2.2 Previous Research 
2.2.1 Possible Explanations 
The previous empirical evidence presents an array of factors which are 
responsible for the increase in the female labor force participation rate. 
The first explanation is the reform of the cash-transfer program. Eissa and Hoynes 
(2003) examine the labor force participation response of married couples to the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansions between 1984 and 1996. They find the labor force 
participation rate of married men increased by about 0.2% and that of married women 
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decreased by just over a full percentage point. There is at most 2% of the change in 
participation rate of married women related to the expansions.  
The second explanation is to compensate the drop of spousal income. Blau and 
Kahn (2007), Heim (2007, 2009) and Triest (1990) find significant negative effects of 
spousal income on the participation probability while Juhn (1992) and Juhn, Murphy and 
Pierce (1993) find real average weekly wages for the less-educated male decreased. It is 
possible that married women increase their labor supply to offset the decrease of their 
spouses, which is doubted by Juhn and Murphy (1997). 
The third explanation is related to the decrease of the wage-gender gap. When the 
wage-gender gap decreases, the opportunity cost of being out of labor force rises and 
females increase their employment. Attanasio, Low and Marcos (2008), Buttet and 
Schoonbroodt (2005), and Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) construct life-cycle 
models of female participation and estimate the effect of the wage-gender gap.  
The forth interpretation is the decrease of child care cost. Attanasio, Low and 
Marcos (2008), Ribar (1992), Powell (1997), Kimmel (1992) find significant negative 
effects of child care costs on the employment probability. Michalopoulos, Robins and 
Garfinkel (1992), Blau and Robins (1991) and Ribar (1995) find little effect of that on 
employment. The role of child care costs is mixed. 
The fifth explanation is the change of commuting time. Kolesnikova (2007) uses 
Census Public Use Micro Sample date for 1980, 1990 and 2000 and documents married 
women’s labor force participation decisions appear to be negative correlated with 
commuting time across urban areas. She shows that metropolitan areas which 
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experienced relatively large increases in average commuting time between 1980 and 
2000 also had slower growth of labor force participation of married women. 
The sixth explanation is “power couple” urbanization. Costa and Kahn (2000) 
shows that college educated couples are more likely to be located in the big metropolitan 
areas, and the average participation rate in these areas would be higher than the non-big 
MSA. If “power couple” is disproportionately living in big MSA, the participation rate in 
big metropolitan areas increases more than in the non-big metropolitan areas. Compton 
and Pollak (2006) use PSID and find no support for Costa and Kahn (2000). The 
conclusions about the role of “power couple” asymmetrical urbanization are ambiguous.  
2.2.2 Empirical Strategy  
I make attempts here to discuss which factors account for the increase of female 
employment with the 5% samples of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS) for 1980, 1990 and 2000. I estimate the following static employment model for 
a pooled sample: 
)0( 12000219801  iiiii uZDDLFP                                                                 (2.1)           
)0
(
24321
2000219801


iiiiii
iii
uZMinutesNonlaborChildCostWageRatio
DDLFP


                        (2.2) 
where for each individual, LFP is married women labor force participation, D1980 is a 
1980 year dummy variable, D2000 is a 2000 year dummy variable, Z is a vector of 
control variables (including age and age square, years of education, indicator for living in 
central city, and indicator for paying mortgage), WageRatio is the wage-gender gap, 
ChildCost is the child care cost, Nonlabor is one’s spousal wage income, Minutes is the 
average work males’ commuting time (in 10 minutes) across states, and u1 and u2 are 
disturbance terms.  
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Model (2.1) is a traditional static participation function in which coefficient α1 
indicates the unexplained increasing in participation rate of married women with 
preschool-aged children from 1980 to 1990 except contributions of control variables, 
while α2 indicates the unexplained decreasing in participation rate in the 1990s. The 
participation rate of married women with preschool-aged children dramatically increased 
in the 1980s and slightly decreased in the 1990s.  I expect coefficient α1 and α2 are 
negative and α1 < α2. Model (2.2) quantifies contributions of various factors in previous 
literatures, including wage-gender gap, child care cost, spousal income and Commuting 
time. I suppose previous factors can partly explain the participation change of married 
women with preschool-aged women. Coefficient α1 and α2 are increased. I also expect 
coefficient α1 and α2 are negative and α1 < α2 in Model (2.2). 
Estimation of Model (2.1) and (2.2) shows an array of econometric difficulties. 
First, my question is on married women with preschool-aged children. Figure 1 in 
Appendix A tells us that the distribution of this group among married women didn’t 
change a lot in the 1980s (from 23.5% to 23%). As the marriage rate falls, married 
women may become more marriage-prone relative to the total population of women, on 
average. I assume there is no relationship between marriage-proneness and the motivation 
to work in the market. Second, the wage rate of nonparticipating wives is not observed. I 
use Heckman’s sample selection procedure to impute the latent wage rate as actual wage 
rate, which is shown in the appendix C. Naturally, given the selection process of women 
into the labor market, the imputed actual wives’ wage rates are over-predicted in lower 
participation period because working women are disproportionately drawn from the high 
end of the talent pool. I am not able to obtain the direct evidence on the child care cost.  
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I focus on a sample of married women between 18 and 65, eliminating 
observations where the wife reported disabled and self-employment. My sample sizes are 
2,088,458, 2,172,046 and 2,175,973 observations for 1980, 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
Figure 2 in appendix A reports the growth in the labor force participation across different 
categories of married females: no children, with preschool-aged children, and with 
school-aged children. The participation rate of women with preschool-aged children 
increased 15.4% from 38.8% to 54.2% in the 1980s. Over the same period, the 
employment of women without child increased 6.1% and rose 12.3% for women with 
school-aged children. Figure 1 in appendix A describes the distribution of women among 
different family structures. The percentage of females without child increased 1.1% in the 
1980s, from 33.6% to 34.7%. For married females with school-aged children and with 
preschool-aged children, it separately decreased 0.6% and 0.5% in the 1980s. There was 
a slight change in the participation rate and the distribution of married females with 
different fertility choices in the 1990s.  
The 5% sample of IPUMS provides information on employment status. The three 
categories are employed, unemployed and not in the labor force. My basic measure of 
labor force participation is a dummy variable to indicate whether married female is 
employed. All monetary variables are inflated or deflated to real dollars from the year 
2000 with using consumer-price-index. I consider hourly wage observations as invalid if 
they are less than $1 or greater than $100 per hour in 2000 dollars. For those with invalid 
wage observations, wages are imputed with using Heckman’s sample selection 
procedure. Buttet and Schoonbroodt (2005) use the wage of single women to 
approximate the return to experience of married women to avoid the wage penalty. I use 
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male’s wage model to impute female wage rate to avoid the wage penalty and the wage-
gender gap. I measure the wage gap with wage ratio, which is the female’s actual wage 
rate divided by the imputed wage rate. Attanasio, Low and Marcos (2008) present some 
evidence on the child care cost with the price of child care workers. I present the child 
care cost with the average hourly wage rate of child care workers over state. Nonlabor 
income is defined as spousal income. To examine the effect of commuting time on 
women’s participation decision, it is necessary to introduce a new measure. Because of 
the selection process of women into the labor market, I use the male’s commuting time as 
a proxy for the fixed time cost of going to work, which is done as Kolesnikova (2007).  In 
addition to previous explanation measures, I include a set of control variables that are 
common to Model (2.1) and (2.2). These include her age and age square, how much 
schooling has been received, dummy variable indicating for living in central city, and for 
paying mortgage.  
Since the participation rate of married women with preschool-aged children 
dramatically increased in the 1980s, I focus on to analyze the behavior change and 
composition change of married women with preschool-aged children. The summary 
statistics are shown in TABLE B1.1. The sample sizes are 490,552, 499,297 and 453,786 
observations for 1980, 1990 and 2000, respectively. The wage ratio increased from 0.70 
to 0.80 in the 1980s, a 0.10 upward change. The wage ratio rose 0.07 in the 1990s, to 
0.87. The wage ratio indicates that wage-gender gap decreased largely in the 1980s and 
slightly in the 1990s, which is matching with the report (1998) by the council of 
economic advisors. TABLE B1.1 reports the wage rate of child care workers in 1990 is 
$7.82 (in 1999 dollars), which is $0.32 less than in 1980 (in 1999 dollars). The child cost 
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changed in the opposite direction in the 1990s, which increased $0.98 to $8.8 in 2000 (in 
1999 dollars). Attanasio, Low and Marcos (2008) report the same trend of initial fall 
followed by a partial recovery. Spousal income increased $6400 in the 1980s (from 
$37300 to $43700) and $7300 in the 1990s to $51000. Commuting time slightly 
increased 3% in the 1980s, from 23 minutes to 23.7 minutes. It increased 16% in the 
1990s, to 27.5 minutes.  
TABLE B1.2 reports the change of commuting time and married women labor 
force participation across the size of MSA from 1980 to 2000. The commuting time 
increased 0.91 minutes in the non-big MSA in the 1980s. Compared to this, the 
commuting time increased less in the big MSA, a 0.31 minutes rise over the same period. 
Following Kolesnikova (2007) and Costa and Kahn (2000)’s conclusion, the increase of 
participation rate in big MSA would be more. In fact, the employment rate in non-big 
MSA increased 11.3% in the 1980s, which is higher than in big MSA. Even more, 
although there was a revealing difference in commuting time between big MSA and non-
big MSA in 1980 or 1990, I can’t find any participation difference in married women 
with preschool-aged children across the size of metropolitan areas in 1980 and 1990.  
2.2.3 Findings 
The estimated results are shown in the left two columns of TABLE B1.3. The 
right two columns of TABLE B1.3 describe the marginal effect of each independent 
variable. As expected, the coefficient α1 and α2 in Model (2.1) are significantly negative, 
and the absolute value of α1 (0.341) is larger than that of α2 (0.0467). Since including 
various factors in previous literatures, the absolute value of α1 in Model (2.2) is decreased 
to it in Model (2.1), 0.303. Also the absolute value of α2 in Model (2.2) is less than it in 
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Model (2.1), 0.0306. The coefficient α1 and α2 in Model (2.2) are also significantly 
negative, and the absolute value of α1 is larger than that of α2. The marginal effect of 
1980 year dummy in Model (2.1) is negative (-0.1349) and less than that of 2000 year 
dummy (-0.0186). The marginal effect of 1980 year dummy in Model (2.2) is negative (-
0.1201) and less than that of 2000 year dummy (-0.0122). The difference of marginal 
effect on 1980 year dummy between Models (2.1) and (2.2) is 0.0148, which is the 
contribution of various factors in previous literatures. The actual participation rate 
increase of married women with preschool-aged children is 0.1538 in the 1980s, from 
38.82% to 54.2%. Those various factors can only explain 9.6% increasing in participation 
rate in the 1980s. The difference of marginal effect on 2000 year dummy between two 
models is 0.0064 and the actual participation rate decrease 0.0091 in the 1990s to 
53.29%. Previous factors can explain 70% decreasing in the 1990s.  
Let us examine results in more detail. TABLE B1.3 indicates that the participation 
decision of married women with preschool-aged children is positively and significantly 
related to their wage ratio in Model (2.2). The marginal effect of wage ratio is then 
largest among various factors in previous literatures, 0.244. Child care cost and spousal 
income significantly and negatively influence the participation decision of these focused 
married women. Marginal effects are -0.0148 and -0.0224, respectively. The coefficient 
of transportation time is insignificantly positive.  
The second set of major results in TABLE B1.3 concerns the impact of control 
variables across both models. The coefficient on age is nonlinear and significant. As 
expected, the coefficient on years of education and indicator of paying mortgage is 
  
16 
significant and positive. Interestingly, the coefficient on indicator of living in the central 
city is significantly positive in Model (2.1) and negatively in Model (2.2).  
TABLE B1.4 reports the predicted changes in wives’ participation rate. Changes 
in labor force participation rate from 1980 to 2000 are driven by shifts in the composition 
of married women with preschool-aged children, while it is possible that changes are 
motivated by changes in average behavior. But I assume the coefficient on measure 
factors are the same over the last two decades. Since the average behavior on each 
measure factor is the same, I consider separate contributions of composition changes in 
each measured factor.  
Across the three years’ equations shown in TABLE B1.3, measured factors 
explain 2.23% and 4.75% of the growth in female participation rate over the 1980s using 
Model (2.1) and (2.2), respectively. Overall, control variables predict 14.5% increasing in 
participation rate over the 1980s, which is the ratio between explanation rate and actual 
change rate. Those control variables and various factors in previous literatures are able to 
explain more, 30.9% change in participation rate over the 1980s. Using Model (2.1) and 
(2.2), measured factors predict 0.89% and 0.24% increase in employment rate over the 
1990s, which is opposite to the actual drop. 
In consideration of the contribution of each independent variable, the decrease of 
wage-gender gap can explain 2.44% growth over the 1980s, and 1.71% increase over the 
1990s. The decrease of child care cost can account for 0.43% growth in the 1980s, and 
the increase of child care cost explains 1.47% decrease in the 1990s. Spousal income can 
predict 1.43% drop in the 1980s and 1.64% decrease in the 1990s. Transportation time 
can account for 0.02% increase in participation rate over the 1980s, and 0.13% increase 
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in the 1990s. The next major results in TABLE B1.4 concern contributions of each 
control variable across both models. The increase age can account for 0.07% increase in 
the 1980s and 0.14% decrease in the 1990s using Model (2.1). Using Model (2.2), the 
independent variable, age, can explain more, 0.39% and 0.17% rise in the 1980s and 
1990s, respectively. The increase of years of education can explain more than 
contribution of age in Model (2.1) and (2.2). The coefficient sign of indicator in living in 
the central city is opposite. The decrease percentage of married women in central city 
predicts 0.02% decrease and 0.04% increase in the 1980s in both models, respectively.  
Since this percentage kept sTABLE in the 1990s, the indicator in living in the central city 
predicts no change in the 1990s.  
2.3 Career Work Experience Explanations 
2.3.1 Empirical Strategy 
Goldin (1997, 2004) defines the concept “Career” as working full-time during the 
preceding three years to analyze the college-educated women’s family decision. Light 
and Ureta (1995) find it takes four years for married women to catch up to their 
continuously employed counterparts. I assume women can grasp a professional set of 
skills and networking in order to return in the future after three years working 
accumulation. There are three important fertility stages: first is the career period, second 
is the childbearing period and last is the labor force participation period after 
childbearing. I define the childbearing period as two months before the birth, plus four 
months after the birth. The career period is defined as three years preceding the first birth. 
The labor force participation period is pointed from the first birth to six years after the 
first birth or to six years after the second birth if this female has two children and spacing 
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between first and second birth is less than 6 years or to six years after the third birth if 
this female has over two children and spacing between second and third birth is less than 
6 years. There are only 1% sample (84 observations) with over three children in the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLSYW) and 5% sample (270 
observations) in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).  I introduce 
a new measure on career work experience and labor force participation rate, which is the 
ratio of the number of weeks worked and the total number of weeks during the career 
period and during the labor force participation period, respectively. I focus on the first 
birth because it is the first time for most women to make an unemployment decision. The 
more women work during the three years preceding their first birth, the more they are 
likely to return to work after the childbearing period. Shapiro and Mott (1994) find labor 
force participation post first birth is an important predictor of women’s future working 
behavior. My new measure is used in Goldin (1989) and Light and Ureta (1995), but this 
is the first time for it to be used to analyze the change in female labor force participation.  
I make attempts here to quantify contribution of career work experience for the 
increase of married women participation rate with the NLSYW from 1968 to 2003 and 
NLSY79 from 1979 to 2008. I estimate the following static participation model for a pool 
sample: 
iiiNLSYi uZDLFPR 1791                                                                                       (2.3)           
iiiiiNLSYi uZNonlaborWageRatioDLFPR 221791                                        (2.4) 
iiiiiNLSYi uZNonlaborWageRatioCareerDLFPR 3211791                       (2.5)                                                                                       
where for each individual, LFPR is married women labor force participation rate during 
the labor force participation period, DNLSY79 is a NLSY79 cohort dummy variable, Z is 
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a vector of control variables (including age at the first birth and age square, years of 
education, indicator for living in South, and indicator for Black and Hispanic race), 
WageRatio is the relative child care cost, Nonlabor is one’s spousal wage income, Career 
is the career work experience, and u1 , u2 and u3 are disturbance terms. 
Model (2.3) is a traditional static participation function in which coefficient α1 
indicates the unexplained increasing in participation rate of married women with 
preschool-aged children across cohorts except contributions of control variables. Since 
the participation rate of married women with preschool-aged children dramatically 
increased across cohorts, I expect coefficient α1 is positive. Model (2.4) quantifies 
contributions of various factors in previous literatures, including child care cost and 
spousal income. I also suppose previous factors can partly explain the participation 
change of married women with preschool-aged women. Coefficient α1 is decreased and 
positive. Model (2.5) measures contribution of career rate. Coefficient α1 in Model (2.5) 
is decreased further and positive. Estimation of Model (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) faces the 
same econometric difficulties as Model (2.1) and (2.2). First, the wage rate of 
nonparticipating wives is not observed. I use Heckman’s sample selection procedure to 
impute the latent wage rate as actual wage rate, which is shown in the appendix C. 
Second, I am not able to obtain the direct evidence on the child care cost. I merge the 
average real price of child care workers by year from March CPS between 1960 and 
2010. I control the effect of child care cost and introduce the wage ratio between the 
actual wage rate before childbearing and the price of child care child care cost as an 
independent variable. Nonlabor income is used to represent the spousal income.  
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Married females’ working behaviors vary a lot during the career period. This 
heterogeneity is shown in cumulative career experience in TABLE B1.5. This evidence 
suggests that the traditional measure of career experience (first birth age – education - 6) 
is not adequate for describing married females’ working behaviors.  One of my date sets 
is from the NLSYW. All respondents were 14-24 years old when first surveyed in 1968. 
The career experience is based on NLSYW “key” variables reporting the number of 
weeks worked since the last interview or in the last year. There are often gaps when I do 
not know how many weeks worked. When gaps arise, I subtract the missing time from 
both the numerator and denominator of my “weeks worked” measure. The other date set 
is from the NLSY79. All respondents were 14-22 years old when first surveyed in 1979. 
These individuals were interviewed annually through 1994 and then on a biennial basis. 
The career experience is based on NLSY79 variables reporting LABOR FORCE 
STATUS on a weekly basis. I restrict my sample to those women who are non-military, 
and have their first child after 18 years old.  
TABLE B1.5 reports the cumulative distribution function of career experience. 
The first two rows of the TABLE B1.5 tells us that 66% of women born from 1943-53 
work more than 10% of the time, 46% work more than 50% of the time and only 20% 
work more than 90% of the time during their career period. Generally, women born from 
1957-64 work more during their career period in each group: 73% of women work more 
than 50% of the time, a 27% increase. The percentage of women who work more than 
90% of the time doubled from 20% to 43%. If I further analyze the cumulative 
distribution function by education category, the general changes follow uniformly. The 
distribution shifts to the right for every education category, but the degree of shifting is 
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different, respectively. High school dropouts shift the most to the right. Interestingly, the 
percentage of high school dropouts decreases across cohorts. TABLE B1.5 also describes 
that the relationship between the increase in work continuity and years of education is 
noticeable within cohort. The difference in time spent on working between women with 
different education background decreases in the latter cohort. I see that 21% of high 
school dropout women born from 1943-53 work more than 50% of the time.  For women 
with 12 years of education, it is 60%, a 40% increase. The number is 83% for college 
graduates. In 1957-64 cohorts, 47% of women with 0-11 years of education work more 
than 50% of the career period. For high school graduates, it is 60%, a 13% increase. It is 
clear that traditional working experience or the timing of first birth is not enough control 
for career work experience. TABLE B1.6 reports the cumulative distribution function of 
labor force participation for women with preschool-aged children. I find that a 
considerable amount of heterogeneity in distribution remains even after controlling 
education category.  
The summary statistics are shown in TABLE B1.9. The sample sizes are 2796 and 
2876 observations for NLSYW and NLSY79, respectively. The wage ratio rose 0.46 
across cohorts, from 2.0944 to 2.5499. The wage ratio indicates that the relative wage 
rate increased and real child care cost decreased across cohorts. Figure 3 in appendix A 
describes the trend of the child care expense from 1962 to 2010, which is measured by 
the average wage of child care workers from the March CPS. The child care price 
decreased in the 1980s from $7.31 to $3.64 and increased in the 1990s to $10.7. Spousal 
income increased $2,157 across cohorts, from $35,721 to $37,878. 
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To simplify my analysis, I define “career” women with career rate more than 
50%. The “non-career” type is used to specify women who spend less than 50% working 
during the career period. I use the same criteria to define the labor force participation 
type. My hypothesis is that career women are more likely to return to the labor force after 
their childbearing period. TABLE B1.7 reveals the frequencies of career type and labor 
force employment type across cohorts. Looking across the left panel of TABLE B1.7, I 
see that 53.9% of women born in 1943-53 are non-career type, while only 27.4% of 
women born in 1957-64 choose to be non-career type. I can see that the percentage of 
career type women increases largely across cohorts, from 46.1% to 72.6%.  
I also analyze that the change of the taste between non-career type and career 
type. To derive the preference of different career type women, it is straight forward to 
consider the joint distribution of career type and labor force participation type. It is 
shown as below: 
0.5)eer0.5)Pr(CarCareer|0.5birthAfter  Pr(LFP
0.5)eer0.5)Pr(CarCareer|0.5birthAfter  Pr(LFP 
0.5)Career 0.5,birthAfter  Pr(LFP0.5)Career 0.5,birthAfter  Pr(LFP 
0.5)birthAfter  Pr(LFP




(2.6) 
I use actual distribution in TABLE B1.7 across cohorts to calculate the labor force 
participation rate with equation (2.6): 
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The preference to work continuously after childbearing for career women is 
represented by the conditional distribution in the first item of second equation of equation 
(2.6). It increases from 59% to 66% across cohorts, a 7% upward change. For non-career 
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women, the preference of working after childbearing is shown in the second item of 
second equation of equation (2.6). It increases 2%, from 34% to 36%. Possibly, a factor 
accounts for the change of the preference to work after the childbearing period regardless 
of different career type.  
The above analyses are roughly but enough to lead to a point: the remarkable 
increase in the percentage of career women is a potential factor to explain the trend of the 
labor supply employment of married women with preschool-aged children.  
2.3.2 Empirical Separating Composition Change and Preference Change 
As discussed in section 2, changes in labor force participation rate across cohorts 
are driven by shifts in the composition of married women with preschool-aged children, 
while it is possible that changes are motivated by changes in average behavior. But I 
assume the coefficient on career type is the same across cohorts in Model (2.5). I estimate 
the following model:
iiiiiNLSYNLSYWiiNLSYi uZNonlaborWageRatioCareerCareerDLFPR 4217921791    (2.7) 
I assume the coefficient on career type is different across cohorts, which is the 
difference between Model (2.5) and (2.7). Coefficients δ1 and δ2 are able to capture the 
preference change across cohorts. I expect coefficients δ1 and δ2 are significantly positive 
and δ1 < δ2. Since coefficient α1 indicates the unexplained preference increasing in 
participation rate of married women with preschool-aged children across cohorts except 
contributions of control variables in Model (2.7), I expect coefficient α1 is insignificant.  
From Model (2.7) I am not able to figure out whether the change in the labor 
force participation rate is driven by the change in the composition of career women or the 
working preference of career women. Why would more and more career married women 
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prefer to work after the childbearing? It comes natural to us to analyze the relationship 
between fertility choice and marriage selection (Cancutt, Guner and Knowles (2002), Ge 
(2011) and Sheran (2007)). Cancutt, Guner and Knowles (2002) find that the marriage 
decision of young women explains the incentives for fertility delay. Ge (2011) considers 
the relationship between women’s college decision and marriage choice. Sheran (2007) 
formulates and estimates a discrete dynamic labor supply model in which marriage, 
fertility, and education are choice variables. She finds that women choose different career 
and family life-cycle paths because of uncertainties and their different tastes.  
TABLE B1.8 reveals the average age at first birth and first marriage over career 
types and labor force employment types across cohorts. Behaviors of career women’s 
marriage and fertility choice are surprisingly sTABLE across cohorts. Non-career women 
usually give birth at 21 years old while career women have their first baby at 26 years 
old. The first marriage age is 20 for the non-career women and 23 for the career women. 
It becomes straight forward that a woman’s fertility choice and marriage selection are not 
cause and effect, which is contrary to Sheran’s assumption. Thus I have assumed that a 
woman’s fertility choice and marriage selection are simultaneously determined by other 
factors, such as the women’s work attitude in the family.  
The women’s attitude about the female’s career role in the family is the key 
variable to influence the women’s employment decision. In NLSYW and NLSY79, the 
respondents were asked a few questions related to the female’s attitude towards women’s 
status in the family and career. One of the questions is: “It is much better for everyone 
concerned if the man is the achiever outside the home and the women takes care of the 
home and family.” And there are four categories of answers: 1 strongly disagrees, 2 
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disagree, 3 agree and 4 strongly agree. The variable --work attitude to the women’s status 
is 1 if the answer is disagree or strongly disagree, otherwise it is 0. Around 50% and 
63.8% of women’s attitude about the roles of husband and wife are non-traditional in 
NLSYW and NLSY79, respectively (see TABLE B1.10). 
I estimate the following model: 
iiNLSYiNLSYiNLSY
NLSYWiNLSYWiNLSYWi
iiiiNLSYi
udeWorkAttituCareerCareer
deWorkAttituCareerCareer
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                                                 (2.8) 
I assume the coefficient of career type is δ1 in NLSYW and δ2 in NLSY79 and δ1 
< δ2. I also assume the coefficient of family motivator’s career type is δ11 and that of 
career motivator’s career type is δ11+ δ12 in NLSYW. They are δ21 and δ21+ δ22 in 
NLSY79. My hypothesis is the composition of career motivators among career type has 
changed if δ11 = δ21 and δ11+ δ12 = δ21+ δ22. 
Because I know: 
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Then I can express δ2 - δ1 as below: 
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 TABLE B1.10 tells us that the ratio of career motivators among career type 
women increases 12.19% across cohorts, from 54.38% to 66.57%. In the opposite way, 
the ratio of family motivators among career type women decreases across cohorts. Then: 
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 Naturally, I am able to know the reason that δ1 is less than δ2 is from the change 
in the composition of career motivators among career type women, not from the shifts in 
average preference. Therefore I expect coefficient α1 is insignificant in Model (2.8) and 
the coefficient on career motivator’s career type is equal across cohorts.  
2.3.3 Findings  
TABLE B1.11 provides the results of Model (2.3)-(2.5) and (2.7)-(2.8) across 
cohorts. As expected, the coefficient α1 in Model (2.3)-(2.5) is significantly positive. 
Since including various factors in previous literatures, the value of α1 in Model (2.4), 
0.0761, is decreased to it in Model (2.3), 0.0828. And the value of α1 in Model (2.5) is the 
least among Model (2.3)-(2.5). The difference of marginal effect on NLSY79 cohort 
dummy between Models (2.3) and (2.4) is 0.0067, which is the contribution of various 
factors in previous literatures. The actual labor force participation rate increase of 
married women with preschool-aged children is 0.1088 across cohorts, from 45.87% to 
56.75%. Those various factors can only explain 6.16% increasing in participation rate 
across cohorts. The difference of marginal effect on cohort dummy between Models (2.4) 
and (2.5) is 0.0397 and the composition change of career type can explain 30.33% growth 
across cohorts.  In Model (2.7) I assume the coefficient on career type is different across 
cohorts, preference change in labor force participation rate of married women with 
preschool-aged children across cohorts is able to be explained by the change of 
coefficient on career type. As expected, the coefficient α1 in Model (2.7)-(2.8) is 
insignificant. The difference of marginal effect on cohort dummy between Models (2.5) 
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and (2.7) is 0.0364 and the preference change in career type can explain 33.46% growth 
across cohorts.  
As analyzed in section 3.2, it is possible that the preference change in career type 
is from the change in the composition of career motivating career type women, not from 
the shifts in average preference. Let us examine results in more detail on career type in 
Model (2.5) and (2.7)-(2.8). TABLE B1.11 indicates that the labor force participation rate 
of married women with preschool-aged children is positively and significantly related to 
their career type. In Model (2.5), the average marginal effect of career type is 0.217 
across cohorts. The marginal effect is 0.189 and 0.249 in NLSYW and NLSY79 in Model 
(2.7), respectively. The coefficient gap on career type is 0.06. In Model (2.8), it is more 
complicated. The marginal effect of career motivating career type is 0.252 and 0.271, and 
the difference is only 0.019. The predicted coefficient change in career type from the 
change in the composition of career motivating career type women is 0.0307 or 0.033 
which is the product of the marginal effect (0.252 or 0.271) and the composition change 
(12.19% from TABLE B1.10) of this type women. The marginal effect of family 
motivating career type is 0.12 and 0.215 in NLSYW and NLSY79, and this difference is 
0.095. The composition of family motivating career type women drops from 45.62% to 
33.43%. I am not able to separate the preference change from the composition change for 
the career motivating career type women. The predicted coefficient change in career type 
from these group women is 0.0171 which is the difference of the product of the marginal 
effect and the composition (0.215*33.43%-0.12*45.62%). The change in the composition 
of career motivating career type women can at least explain 51.2% of the coefficient 
change on career type.  
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TABLE B1.11 indicates that the participation decision of married women with 
preschool-aged children is positively and significantly related to their wage ratio and 
negatively related to their spousal income in Model (2.4)-(2.5) and (2.7)-(2.8). The next 
results in TABLE B1.11 concern the impact of control variables across five models. The 
coefficient on age at first birth is nonlinear and significant. The coefficients on years of 
education, indicator of Black race, Hispanic race, and living in the South are significantly 
positive.  
Women’s labor force participation after childbearing grows 10.88% across 
cohorts. To what extent can this change be explained by measured factors and by shifting 
in women’s labor supply preference? TABLE B1.12 describes a decomposition of the 
changes in women’s labor force participation by showing the effect of different levels on 
the explanatory variables across cohorts.  
Across the results shown in TABLE B1.11, measured factors explain 2.6%, 
3.27%, and 7.24% of the growth in female participation rate across cohorts using Model 
(2.3)-(2.5), respectively. Overall, control variables predict 23.9% increasing in 
participation rate across cohorts, which is the ratio between explanation rate and actual 
change rate. Those control variables and various factors in previous literatures are able to 
explain more, 30.06% change in participation rate across cohorts. Using Model (2.5) with 
career type factor, measured factors can explain 66.54% increase in employment rate 
across cohorts. Since Model (2.7) is able to capture the preference change in the career 
type women across cohorts, the unexplained changes (33.46%) in Model (2.5) suggest 
that the preference of career type women shifts to the right across cohorts. Measured 
factors in Model (2.7) and (2.8) can explain 101% growth in participation rate across 
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cohorts. I claim there are two kinds of career women, one is family motivating type and 
the other one is career motivating type. Model (2.8) includes the motivation factor and 
finds the change in the composition of career motivating career type women can at least 
explain 17.22% growth in the labor force participation rate across cohorts.  
Let us look at the contribution of each independent variable. The increase of wage 
ratio can explain 1.33%-1.79% growth across cohorts. Spousal income can predict 0.47% 
drop across cohorts. Model (2.3) predicts that the increase age at first birth can account 
for 1.37% increase; Model (2.4) predicts 0.94% increase. After including career type as 
an independent variable, the increase age at first birth predict 0.44%-0.47% drop. It is 
natural that career type women prefer to delay their first birth.  
2.4 Conclusions  
The labor supply participation of married women increased dramatically over the 
last three decades of the 20th century, especially married women with preschool-aged 
children. A lot of possible factors are used to explain this growth in employment, such as 
the reform of the cash-transfer program, the compensation for the drop of spousal 
income, the decrease of wage-gender gap, the decrease of child care price, the change of 
commuting time across urban areas, and the urbanization of power couples. Using 5% 
samples of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for 1980, 1990 and 
2000, I investigate previous explanations and can’t find a sensible conclusion. Using the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLSYW) from 1968 to 2003 and the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) from 1979 to 2008, I focus on 
the increase in labor supply of females with preschool-aged children. I introduce a new 
variable to measure the heterogeneity of females’ career work experience and define 
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career women and non-career women. The increase in the female labor supply 
employment is very responsive to a wife’s career type before the first birth. My results 
show that the rising of the percentage of career women can explain 30.33% of the growth 
across cohorts. Among the unexplained changes, the change in the composition of career 
motivating career type women can at least explain 51.2%. That means it can at least 
explain 17.22% growth in the labor force participation rate across cohorts. 
 
  
31 
CHAPTER III  
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS IN STRUCTURAL MODELS 
3.1 Introduction 
The parameters of interest in the estimation of labor supply are the 
uncompensated (Marshallian) and compensated (Hicksian) elasticity. These parameters 
show how labor supply reacts to changes in economic variables and are the key to 
evaluating the effect of a large array of public policies, including tax and social welfare 
programs. The most popular estimation method is referred to as the Hausman structural 
method, which is developed by Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1981), and 
Hausman (1985). The Hausman approach explicitly models individuals' desired hours of 
work as the outcome of utility maximization subject to the nonlinear budget constraints. 
The utility function parameters, which also are parameters in the corresponding labor 
supply function, are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. As discussed in 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), the Hausman method has several attractive features: it 
recognizes the institutional features of the tax systems, and it incorporates the fixed cost 
of holding a job. 
Unfortunately, economists find different values for these key parameters. TABLE 
2 in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) summarizes eleven papers using non-linear budget 
constraints for married women. The uncompensated wage elasticity varies from .28 
(Triest 1990) to .97 (Hausman 1981). Even more puzzling, studies using the same or 
similar data sources, econometric specification and estimation technique often report 
different elasticities. Hausman (1981) uses PSID of 1975 and finds a wage effect close to 
zero. MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) use the same data set and report a negative 
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wage rate coefficient. Triest (1990) tries PSID of 1983 and gets a positive wage effect. 
These conflicting results are called as the “Hausman puzzle” in Blomquist (1996).  
There are some attempts in the literature to explain and address the discrepancies 
in estimates within Hausman’s framework. MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) 
demonstrate that the econometric model produced by piecewise-linear formulation 
implicitly imposes parametric restrictions that constrain the sign of estimated substitution 
and income effects. MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch suggest smoothing the budget 
segments so make them differentiable everywhere, and hence insure only one solution for 
each individual. However, this approach negates the advantages of Hausman’s 
framework. Even when using the same model some have found the econometric 
specification itself causes different results. Triest (1990) tries a linear function 
specification. Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) choose nonlinear function 
specification. Blomquist and Newey (2002) investigate nonparametric specification. The 
estimates of Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities are sensitive to the function 
specification. Finally, some have advanced measurement error in the wage rate as an 
explanation. Eklof and Sacklen (2000) suggest that the wage measure adopted by 
MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) might cause a severely downward-biased wage 
effect. 
While plenty of explanations try to figure out the variation in elasticities, Blundell 
and MaCurdy (2007) point out that there is very little work analyzing the budget sets of 
the piecewise-linear procedure. This chapter discusses the role of budget sets in 
producing this wide range of estimates. In particular, Hausman (1981), Triest (1990), 
MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) and Heim (2008) use convexified budget sets. If 
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hours and consumption are not near perfect substitutes, a minor difference in the 
convexification approximation would not cause a large change in hours of work. I study 
if the convexification approximation has important consequences on labor-supply 
estimates. 
Heckman (1983) also suggests some other major concerns of Hausman’s 
approach, which are later extended by Burtless and Moffitt (1984), Friedberg (2000), 
Heim and Meyer (2004) and Saez (1999, 2009). Heckman’s key concerns are that budget 
segments can’t be accurately measured in most cases. The basic assumption of 
Hausman’s approach is that there is bunching around the kink points. In reality, few of 
taxpayers bunch at the kink points of the U.S. income tax schedule. Burtless and Moffitt 
(1984) and Friedberg (2000) observe bunching at the convex kink induced by retirement. 
Heim and Meyer (2004) indicate that there tends to be a noticeable amount of bunching 
of the data around certain levels of hours, such as 2000 annual hours or 40 weekly hours. 
Saez (1999, 2009) points out that clear evidence of bunching is found only at the first 
kink point. I investigate if estimations are sensitive to the uncertain budget constraints. 
In the comment on Hausman’s method, Heckman (1983) wrote, “Hausman's 
econometric procedures require that the budget set confronting the consumer be known 
to the econometrician.”1 To address Heckman’s criticism, I introduce measurement error 
in nonlabor income to solve the Heckman critique of Hausman’s approach. I define 
nonlabor income as the family's income less the wife's labor income.
2
 Such measurement 
error is conceptually well-founded. It naturally shifts the intercept on the vertical axis of 
                                                 
1 Italics originally in Heckman (1983). 
2 Triest (1990) defines nonlabor income as equal to the sum of their husbands’ labor income and asset 
income. We try these two different variables in estimation. Different definitions do not influence results.
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the budget constraints and changes the location of the kink points of the budget 
constraints. Then it changes the slope of the budget constraints. Hence, it generates the 
uncertain budget segments, which seem to be precisely in line with Heckman's 
comments.  
This chapter will (1) propose a new model to estimate labor supply function to 
solve Heckman’s critique and (2) estimate with nonconvexified piecewise-linear budget 
constraints. I apply my method to estimate the labor supply for married women using the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data of 1984 and 2001. I find that neither the 
convexification approximation nor using a model with random budget sets affects the 
estimates. Variations in budget constraints are not the main explanations for the different 
estimates of elasticities. Changing the level of budget sets, for example ignoring the state 
individual income tax, could affect the variation in elasticities.  
The main objective is to estimate and test various specifications of the model in 
the convexified, the nonconvexified and random constraints. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I discuss in detail the various models. Used data 
sets, the U.S. individual tax system and convexification of the budget constraints are 
described in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 estimates the models and outlines results. I conclude 
in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Different Specifications of Three Models 
Hausman (1981) introduces a static equilibrium labor supply model, and assumes 
that the before-tax wage is constant without inter-temporal optimization of labor supply. 
Hausman’s approach begins with a typical labor supply model of utility maximization for 
individual i with respect to choices about leisure and other consumption goods xi, where 
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the price of x is normalized to be 1. The hours of work are defined to be hi, so T-hi is 
leisure. Without taxes, the person’s nonlabor income is yi, and the real wage rate is wi. 
The indirect utility v(wi,yi) is the maximum value of the direct utility u(xi,hi) that can be 
obtained when facing the budget constraint: 
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Hausman (1981) assumes a linear specification of the demand function first, and 
then recovers the indirect utility function for that demand function using Roy’s identity,  
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The indirect utility function when hi > 0 is 
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If it is the dual additive errors model, then iiZs    and 0  ; if it is 
Hausman’s random income coefficient model, then iZs   add i  0 . ijy
~  is the 
virtual income, defined as the intercept of the line that extends this budget segment to the 
zero-hours axis (see TABLE B2.1).                                  
When a person is at a kink point, the indifference curve is not tangent to the 
budget sets, so the utility level can only be obtained from the direct utility function. At 
kink point j, the direct utility function corresponding to the labor supply function is 
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ijy  is the after-tax income.       
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3.2.1 Budget Segment and Tax Revenues 
An individual i faces a piecewise-linear budget constraint. Let a tax bracket be 
characterized by {tj; Yj-1, Yj}, where tj is the marginal tax rate for a person whose before-
tax income lies within the interval (Yj-1, Yj]. Information about {tj; Yj-1, Yj} can be found 
from tax tables. Note the relevant budget set is based on after-tax income. Let the end 
points of the segment in a budget set that corresponds to bracket {Yj-1, Yj} be {yj-1
a
, yj
a
} 
where y
a
 refers to after-tax income. A complete characterization of budget segments 
requires information on working hours that corresponds to the set [yj-1
a
, yj
a
], and I denote 
these hours as [Hj-1, Hj]. To calculate the location of each budget segment, I start with the 
first budget segment and proceed through all budget segments. Besides the before-tax 
wage rate w, another critical piece of information is Y
n, the individual’s nonlabor income. 
Let y
n
 be after-tax nonlabor income, where the tax is calculated as if the person had no 
labor income. Then any labor income pushes the person into even higher tax brackets. I 
summarize information on budget segments in TABLE B2.1. 
It is well documented in the literature that in the presence of piecewise-linear 
budget constraints a person's optimal hours may be at a kink point instead of being on a 
segment.
3
 Let Ni be the total number of segments of the budget set of individual i. Define 
iij
iij
K N0,1,..., = j          
otherwise; 0
j,point kink at  if 1
N1,..., = j             
otherwise; 0
j,segment  on if 1
S








                                                                (3.2) 
                                                 
3 We define “being on segment” as being in the interior of (Hj-1, Hj). 
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Following common practice, I assume the labor supply function is linear. Let hij
*
 
be the optimal hours for person i if his budget constraint were on segment j, and let wij be 
the after tax wage rate for person i if his budget constraint were on segment j. Then, 


 

otherwise                                 0
positive if~  ,* iiijij
ij
Zyw
h

                                                                         (3.3) 
where 
ijy
~  is virtual income and Zi represents other socio-demographic variables that 
affect the labor supply, such as the number of children in the household, the age of the 
worker, the worker’s education, and the local unemployment rate. Since Zi does not vary 
across different segments, the term Zi will not be included in my equations hereafter to 
simplify the notation, although the term is included when the model is estimated. One 
important term in (3.3) is εi, representing heterogeneity in preferences based on 
unobservable factors. Given the labor supply function in (3.3), the necessary condition 
for Sij = 1 is 
jijiijijijij NjHywHS ,...,1 ,
~   if   1  1                                                       (3.4) 
The necessary condition for Kij = 1 is: 
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If a budget set is globally convex, the highest indifference curve must either touch 
a single kink point or be tangent to a single segment because of the weak axiom of 
revealed preference (WA). Conditions (3.4) and (3.5) are necessary and sufficient and
1
01


ii N
j
ij
N
j
ij KS . However, if a budget set is non-convex due to the fixed cost of 
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working or some income transfer program (such as EITC, AFDC or TANF),
4
 then 



ii N
j
ij
N
j
ij KS
01
 may be greater than 1. A global utility comparison is required to 
determine the work hours desired. The optimal hours worked should offer the maximum 
utility among all the segments and kink points. I use simulated maximum likelihood 
estimation to catch non-convex budget constraints. 
Various specifications of labor supply are suggested in the literature. They differ 
in their treatment of the error terms of Equation (3.3). Next, I introduce two influential 
specifications and then discuss my specification. 
3.2.2 Hausman’s Original Model 
Hausman (1981) introduces the random income coefficient model. Let hi
*
 be the 
true working hours for individual i, specified as: 
ijiiji ywh
~)( 0
*                                                                                                    (3.6) 
where the coefficient β in Equation (3.3) becomes a random variable, i  0 . The 
random error εi is not observed by the econometrician. Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz 
(1990) and Triest (1990) introduce the dual additive errors model, which is shown in 
(3.3). I call these two models Hausman’s original model. The necessary and sufficient 
decision rule under global convex budget sets is summarized in (3.7). 
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4 The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a subsidy program with positive net wage rates; Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced in 1996 by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF). 
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When
ijij yx
~~  , the decision rule in (3.7) is for Hausman’s random income 
coefficient model. The stochastic term i , as argued by Hausman (1981), arises due to the 
heterogeneity of preferences. This term is not observed by econometricians but is known 
to individual i. When 1~ ijx , the decision rule (3.7) is for the dual additive errors model, 
which is suggested in Triest (1990) and Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990). The 
stochastic term i  is the heterogeneity in preferences.  
When a budget set is non-convex due to some income transfer program (such as 
the EITC), the decision rule becomes more complicated. 
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(3.8) 
In this framework, I assume the true budget set for each individual is known by 
both the econometrician and the worker. However, the econometrician cannot assign the 
worker to a particular segment or kink point because of the individual heterogeneity εi. 
The probabilities that the worker is at each segment or kink point can be computed by the 
econometrician from the decision rule in (3.7) or (3.8). 
There is yet another error in this framework: the measurement error in working 
hours, denoted as ui. The observed working hours hi deviates from the true working hours 
by ui: 
*
i ij ih h u                                                                                                                      (3.9) 
The decision rules in (3.7) or (3.8) do not include those who do not work. 
Following Hausman (1981), the decision rule for people with zero hours of work can 
come from two sources: the optimal hours zero regardless the values of ui, i.e., hi
*≤0, or 
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ui is negative enough that hi≤0 when hi
*
>0. The decision rule for zero hours is 
summarized in (3.10): 
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Hausman (1981) assumes that observed hours is equal to zero whenever desired 
hours are zero. The density function of observed hours when hi>0, f (hi), based on the 
decision rule in (3.7) and the measurement error in (3.9) is given by
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  (3.11) 
The first term is the joint density of desired hours being in the interior of one of 
the segments of the budget constraints, the second term is the joint density of desired 
hours being at one of the kink points, and the last term is the joint density of desired 
hours being equal to the maximum possible value. The probability of observed hours 
when hi=0 based on the decision rule in (3.10) is given by: 
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The third term is the probability that desired hours of work is zero, and the 
remaining three terms correspond to the three terms in (3.11). If the budget constraints 
are not globally convex, the density function of observed hours when hi>0, f (hi), based 
on the decision rule in (3.8) and the measurement error in (3.9) is given by 
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where the indirect utility function is
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The direct utility function is 
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The last term in (3.13) is an approximate value of the density of h by simulated 
maximum likelihood (SML) and randomly drawing the error term   1000 times. Because 
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the indicator function )0)((1 * irih  is neither continuous nor differentiable, I introduce a 
kernel function (3.16) to calculate the score vector and information matrix. 
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The probability of observed hours when hi=0 is given by 
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Utility function form follows (3.14) and (3.15). When λ = 0, this encompassing 
model becomes the dual additive errors model. When λ = 1, it becomes Hausman’s 
random income coefficient model. By virtue of this nesting, likelihood ratio tests can be 
performed. 
Although the likelihood function in (3.11) and (3.12) assumes perfect knowledge 
of the budget segments for each individual by the econometrician, assigning a person to a 
kink point or a budget segment is not perfect because of heterogeneity in preferences 
among individual. The model does not suffer from observations piling up at any point. 
But rather, each observed working hours may have positive probabilities at any segment 
or at any kink point. 
As pointed out by Blundell and MaCurdy (2007), there are two problems in this 
model: (1) The model makes a rather suspicious assumption of perfect knowledge of the 
entire budget constraints by econometricians, the same as Heckman’s critique, and (2) 
The measurement error in hours of work implies measurement error in wages, an issue 
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which is not addressed in this setting. In the next part, I consider an alternative 
specification, namely, measurement error in nonlabor income. This alternative addresses 
both criticisms of Hausman’s original models. 
3.2.3 Measurement Error in Nonlabor Income 
In this section, I introduce measurement error in nonlabor income Yi
n
. Let 
*n n
i i iY Y                                                                                                                   (3.18) 
where Yi
n*
 is the true nonlabor income, known by individual i, but unobserved by 
econometricians. The measurement error for an observed value Yi
n 
is εi. Again, let Hij
*
 
and *
1
~
ijy  be the true values observed by individual i but not to the econometrician. 
Obtained from TABLE B2.1, Equation (3.19) lists the relationships between observed 
values and the true values. 
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Since individual i observes true values Hij
*
 and *
1
~
ijy , the optimal choice of 
segment j or kink point j is based on the true values. The true necessary decision process 
by individual i can be expressed as 
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Since the decision process in (3.20) is not perfectly observed by the 
econometrician due to measurement error in Yi
n
, it is only possible to assign values of Kij 
and Sij based on observed values of Yi
n
. In (3.21), I rewrite (3.20) in terms of observables 
Hij and ijy
~ . The necessary decision rules when hi > 0 are 
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Let ui be the usual residual in the linear working hours equation based on true 
variables. The model in (3.3) becomes: 
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Rewriting (3.22) into (3.23) with observed variables: 
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Again, following Hausman (1981), the observations that hi = 0 are obtained from 
two sources: those whose optimal hours are zero, and those when *
ii hu  . The necessary 
decision rules that hi = 0 are given in (3.24) 
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Because measurement error in nonlabor income implies the random budget 
constraints, I do not know whether random budget sets are globally convex or not. The 
necessary decision rules (3.21) and (3.24) may not be sufficient. The density function of 
observed hours when )(,0 ii hfh  is 
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The indirect utility function is 
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The log likelihood function is
0 01 log ( ) 1 logPr( 0)i ih i h ii f h h   . I henceforth 
refer to equations (3.25) and (3.26) as the MENLI model, for the “Measurement Error in 
Nonlabor Income” model. In this regard, it resolves the Hausman-Heckman concern. 
More importantly, the measurement error in nonlabor income leads to uncertainty for the 
econometrician about each individual's budget constraints. This is exactly in line with 
Heckman's concern. 
3.3 Data 
In this section, I apply the various models discussed in the previous section to two 
data sets: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data of 1984 and 2001. Typically, 
the errors εi and ui in Hausman’s framework are assumed to be jointly normal. 
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3.3.1 The U.S. Individual Income Tax System in 1983 and 2000  
Wave XVII of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is one of the sources 
of data for my empirical work. Data for this wave is collected in 1984 but pertains to the 
calendar year 1983. The 1983 U.S. Individual Income Tax System is described in Section 
3 of Triest (1990). I consider federal income tax, state income tax, social security and 
Medicare payments, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The PSID of 2001 is the 
second source of data for my empirical work. The U.S. federal individual income tax of 
2000 consists of a progressive 6 bracket system. TABLE B2.2 presents the taxable 
income ranges and marginal tax rates.  
The personal exemption is $2,800 and a $7,350 deduction is built into couples’ 
budget constraints of 2000 if sample couples indicate they use the standard deduction and 
their filing status is married filing jointly. If couples claim to use itemized deductions, 
their deduction value is assigned by the average itemized deduction (excluding the state 
tax payments deduction) within their adjusted gross income class published in Individual 
Income Tax Returns 2000 (Internal Revenue Service 2003, p.38). Following Triest 
(1990), I assume that couples who itemize deductions on their federal returns also itemize 
on their state returns and claim the same amount of deductions.  
State individual income tax rates of 2000 vary. Nine states do not impose a state 
individual income tax. Another nine states impose a flat tax. Among them, Colorado, 
Illinois, Indiana and Michigan impose a flat rate on federal adjusted gross income with 
modification; Rhode Island and Vermont impose a flat rate on federal income tax 
liability; Tennessee, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire impose a flat rate on dividends 
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and interest. There are 33 states imposing a progressive tax similar to the federal income 
tax.  
In the United States, state tax payments may be deducted from federal taxable 
income by those who itemize. The effective marginal tax rate decreases from (tf + ts), 
where tf is the federal marginal tax rate and ts are the state marginal tax rate, to (tf + ts - 
tfts) for itemizers due to this deduction. In addition, sixteen states (in 1983) and nine 
states (in 2000) allow a deduction for federal tax payments. The marginal tax rate thus 
declines to (tf + ts -2 tfts) / (1- tfts). Following Hausman (1981), Triest average the state 
tax rates over the segments created by the federal tax. In this chapter, I construct the 
piecewise-linear budget constraints by adding additional segments to the federal budget 
constraints. This is one sources of difference between in my budget constraints and in 
Triest’s budget sets. If a sample member is in a state that allows the taxpayer to fully 
deduct the federal income tax to reduce her effective marginal tax rate, there are mutual 
deductions of payments. The federal income tax schedule is changed to Df(1 - tfts) /(1- ts), 
and the state income tax schedule is changed to Ds (1 - tfts) /(1- tf), where Df denotes the 
distance from the current taxable income to the end point of this federal interval bracket 
if tf does not change, and Ds denotes the distance from the current taxable income to the 
end point of this state interval bracket if ts keeps constant. Therefore, the tax interval 
bracket is the minimum number between the federal income tax schedule and the state 
income tax schedule. If a sample member is in a state that does not allow deducting the 
federal income tax, this sample member’s federal income tax schedule is changed and 
state income tax schedule is not. The federal income tax schedule is changed to Df /(1- ts). 
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The tax interval bracket is the minimum number between the federal income tax schedule 
and the state income tax schedule. 
Although federal and state individual income tax rates are globally convex, phase-
out brackets in social security payments and the EITC program create concave kink 
points in individual budget constraints. In addition to the income tax, workers contribute 
6.2 percent of their earnings (up to $76,200) in social security payments of 2000 and 1.45 
percent of their earnings (no upper limit) in Medicare payments of 2000; employers make 
the same matching contribution. I treat the employee contribution as a pure tax, and 
ignore the employer contribution. 
The EITC is a refundable tax credit, which is designed to encourage low-income 
workers to work and reduce the burden of U.S. payroll taxes. TABLE B2.3 shows the 
Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters in 1983 and 2000. Compared to the EITC in 1983, 
the EITC in 2000 is expanded both intensively and extensively. In the tax year 2000, 
there is a much more modest credit for couples without children that reached a maximum 
credit of $353. A claimant with one qualifying child could receive a maximum credit of 
$2,353. A claimant with two qualifying children could receive a maximum credit of 
$3,888. In other words, for a person with two qualifying children, the credit is equal to 
40% of the first $9,720 of earned income, reaching a plateau of $3,888 and staying there 
until earnings increase beyond $12,690, at which point the credit begins to phase out at 
21.06%, reaching zero as earnings pass $31,152. Figure 4 in appendix A shows that the 
EITC creates a concave budget constraint of OABCD, making it theoretically much more 
likely that an individual's utility-maximizing bundle will include some hours of work. At 
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kink point A, because the phase-out rate is larger than the IRS tax rate, A is a concave 
point.  
One source of differences in my budget sets could be caused by how I treat the 
EITC in wives’ budget sets. Triest (1990) and Heim (2008) assume that women take their 
husbands’ earnings as given.  Actually, few wives were eligible for the credit in EITC. 
Triest and Heim do not consider the EITC in wives’ budget sets and eliminate any 
concave kink points. This modification will potentially preclude married women’s 
optimal decisions.  
In the end, about 50% of the married women face at least two nonconvex 
segments of their budget sets. There are 494 observations in PSID (1984) and 522 wives 
in PSID (2001) facing concave kink points.  
Convexification of the budget constraint is done in MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch 
(1990).
5
 Figure 5 in appendix A shows the process I use to approximate budget sets. The 
solid lines represent the general budget constraints, while the dotted line represents the 
convexification over the concave kink points.  As shown, the relevant region around 
concave kink points is replaced by a single convex segment to construct convex budget 
sets. The absolute difference is given by (C1 – C2) dollars. The relative difference is 
calculated by 100
2
21 




 
C
CC
. The largest absolute difference is $5721 in 1984 and 
$1266 in 2001. The mean of absolute difference is $236 in 1984 and $237 in 2001. The 
                                                 
5 TABLE 1 in MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) show that the difference between the convexified and 
the nonconvexified constraints is small, but MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch do not compare and imply that 
convexification has unimportant consequences on labor-supply estimates.  
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maximum relative difference is 21% in 1984 and 22% in 2001. The mean value is about 
1%.  
3.3.2 Data Sets 
I analyze wave XVII of the PSID (1984) and the PSID of 2001. The extraction 
criterion is the same as Triest (1990). I focus on non-disabled married couples between 
ages 25 and 55. Because of the backward bending supply curve of labor and the assumed 
linear labor supply function, I consider salaried workers, with average hourly earnings 
between $1 and $50 in 1983 and between $1 and $80
6
 in 2000. This selection procedure 
results in 1050 observations from 1984 and 1171 observations from 2001.  
I assume that the difference between total household income and wives’ labor 
income is nonlabor income. For characteristic variables to describe wives’ observed 
heterogeneity, I add annual mortgage payments and a dummy for house ownership. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the labor supply estimation are presented in 
TABLE B2.4. The female labor force participation rate is larger in 2000 (84.12%) than in 
1983 (73.43%). I use Heckman’s sample selection procedure to impute the latent wage 
rates of nonparticipating wives. It is shown in the appendix D. 
3.4 Estimation 
I use direct search methods, gradient methods and simulated annealing
7
 to find the 
optimum value of the likelihood function. I also experiment with different starting points 
to obtain a global optimum result. 
8
 
                                                 
6 If we correct wives’ wage rate using CPI-Urban Price Index,  $50 in 1983 is equal to $86 in 2000.  
7 In matlab, fminsearch is a direct search method that does not use numerical or analytic gradients. fmincon 
uses a sequential quadratic programming (SQP) method. In this method, the function solves a quadratic 
programming (QP) subproblem at each iteration. fmincon updates an estimate of the Hessian of the 
Lagrangian at each iteration using the BFGS formula. Simulated annealing (SA) is a generic probabilistic 
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TABLEs B2.5, B2.6 and B2.7 show results from the PSID of 1984. Results from 
the PSID of 2001 are shown in TABLE B2.8. TABLE B2.5 shows the estimates for all 
three models: Hausman’s random income coefficient model, the dual additive errors 
model and the MENLI model under the federal individual tax, listed in TABLE B2.2. I 
assume all households take the standard deduction ($3,400 in 1983) and file jointly. 
Estimators from the above three models under the U.S. individual tax system without 
convexification are shown in TABLE B2.6. The U.S. individual tax system is introduced 
in section 3.3. I approximate the budget sets, shown in Figure 5 in appendix A, and 
estimations are shown in TABLE B2.7.  
TABLE B2.5 lists the results for five different econometric specifications. The 
first column corresponds to the dual additive errors model in (3.11) and (3.12) with 0
. Hausman (1981) models heterogeneity in preferences as a random income coefficient, 
which is estimated and reported in the third column. The second column represents the 
statistical model that nests Hausman’s random income coefficient model and the dual 
additive errors model. The value of λ shows which model performs better. The fourth 
column is the MENLI model, with density given by (3.25) and (3.26). I can model 
measurement error in nonlabor income with non-zero mean, which represents the mean 
tax liability or deduction. Results are reported in the fifth column.  
In TABLE B2.6, although poor health and education are not significant according 
to Hausman’s random income coefficient model, they are significant, respectively, at the 
                                                                                                                                                 
metaheuristic for the global optimization problem of applied mathematics, namely locating a good 
approximation to the global optimum of a given function in a large search space. It is often used when the 
search space is discrete. 
8 Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) use about 20 starting points to obtain a global optimum. We try 
at least 10 starting point for each model with each optimization method to find a global optimum.   
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10 percent and 1 percent level in the dual additive errors model. From the results of the 
MENLI model with non-zero mean, having an additional preschool-age child reduces 
working hours by 297 while a 6 to 18-year-old child reduces working hours by 108. On 
average, older women work less, reducing their labor supply 17 hours for every birthday. 
If the principal owed on all mortgages and land contracts increases $1000, married 
women prefer to work 26 hours more. However, due to the mortgage interest deduction, 
house ownership actually decreases wives’ labor supply.  
The wage rate parameter α in Hausman’s random income coefficient model is 
65.17(17.54), and β, the virtual income parameter, is -0.012(0.0028). In the dual additive 
errors model α is 62.35(12.67), which is slightly less in magnitude than Hausman’s 
random income coefficient estimate, and β is -.0131 (.0019). In the MENLI model 
estimate α is 77.7(12.97), which is larger in magnitude than estimates from Hausman’s 
original models. The estimate for β is -.0112(.0029). In the nesting model between 
Hausman’s random income coefficient model and the dual additive errors model, the 
nesting parameter λ is .497, close to 0.5. The dual additive errors model and Hausman’s 
random income coefficient model explain the data equally well. If I let the mean of the 
measurement error in nonlabor income ε vary, from Equation (3.18), Yi
n
* is the true value 
of the nonlabor income that the person i uses to obtain her budget set. If 0)( E , then
)()( * ni
n
i YEYE  . Because of the U.S. individual tax system without convexification, the 
approximate state tax liability and the social security tax liability must be included in the 
budget constraints. On average, each wife faces no extra tax liability. The mean of the 
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measurement error is not significant. 
9
 Given the slight difference in the key parameters, 
it is not surprising to see the small difference in elasticity. The overall female 
uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticities in Hausman’s random income 
coefficient model are 0.21 and 0.26, respectively. Based on the dual additive errors 
model, the uncompensated elasticity is 0.20, and the compensated elasticity is 0.26.
10
 The 
MENLI model says that the Marshallian elasticity is about 0.25 and the Hicksian 
elasticity is 0.30, which are 19.8% larger than the dual additive errors model and 16.1% 
larger than Hausman’s random income coefficient model. The MENLI model with non-
zero mean gives the same elasticities as the MENLI model.  
In TABLE B2.7, elasticities from estimation of the dual additive errors model 
(Column 1) and Hausman’s random income coefficient models (Column 3) are virtually 
identical. Compared with results in TABLE B2.6, the uncompensated elasticities 
decrease 11% and 6.8%, respectively. The nesting parameter in the nest model (Column 
2) is 0.5, which is the same as before. Consequently, the difference in the convexified and 
the nonconvexified constraints does not imply large variation in labor supply estimates.  
Estimates from considering only the federal individual income tax are shown in 
TABLE B2.5. Given the large difference in the key parameters, it is not surprising to see 
the large difference in elasticity. The overall female uncompensated and compensated 
labor supply elasticities in Hausman’s random income coefficient model are 0.29 and 
                                                 
9 1 is the measurement error in husband labor income, 2 is the measurement error in family nonlabor 
income. The reason we separate them is the social security tax base is labor income and federal and state 
individual tax base is AGI.   
10 We change the unit of dependent variable from 1000 hours to 1 hour to compare our results with those 
of Triest (1990). But it is difficult to determine why the results here differ so markedly from those of 
Triest(1990). We extract data from the PSID following the procedure in Triest (1990). Some difference 
appears between our data and the Triest data. Our data set has 1,050 observations while the Triest data set 
has only 978 observations. As Triest claimed, computational problems may also play a role. 
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0.42. From the dual additive errors model, the uncompensated elasticity is 0.34, and the 
compensated elasticity is 0.46.
11
 The MENLI model indicates that the Marshallian 
elasticity is 0.22 and the Hicksian elasticity is 0.32, which are smaller than both the dual 
additive errors model and Hausman’s random income coefficient model. Estimates from 
the MENLI model with non-zero mean are smaller than the MENLI model with zero 
mean. On average, each couple needs to pay an extra $3673 for the state tax and the 
social security tax. In the nesting model between Hausman’s random income coefficient 
model and the dual additive errors model, the nesting parameter λ is .0025. The dual 
additive errors model matches the data set better than Hausman’s random income 
coefficient model. Thus, if I miss the state individual tax to construct budget constraints, 
there is a bias in the level of budget constraints and this bias causes a large variation of 
estimates.  
In TABLE B2.8, the first three columns show results under the nonconvexified 
budget constraints. The right two columns represent estimates under the convexified 
budget sets. As expected, the difference in the convexified and the nonconvexified 
constraints does not imply variation in labor supply estimates in the PSID of 2001. Due to 
the convexified approximation, the uncompensated elasticities in the dual additive errors 
model and Hausman’s random income coefficient model change 1.7% and 19.7%, 
respectively. The compensated elasticities in the dual additive errors model and 
Hausman’s random income coefficient model change 11.5% and 7.8%, respectively. The 
relative difference of uncompensated elasticity between the MENLI model and 
Hausman’s random income coefficient model is 8.1% under the nonconvexified budget 
                                                 
11 See footnote 10.
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sets. The difference in elasticities between 1983 and 2001 are striking. The 
uncompensated elasticity in the MENLI model under the nonconvexified budget 
constraints drops from 0.25 to 0.07, a decrease of 73.5%. Hausman’s random coefficient 
model and the dual additive errors model follow the same trends under the convexified 
and the nonconvexified budget constraints. 
12
  
3.5 Conclusions 
Hausman’s framework to estimate labor supply on piecewise-linear budget 
constraints has many advantages over the reduced-form approach. The estimated labor 
supply elasticity varies substantially even though the similar frameworks and data sets are 
used. The role of budget sets in producing this wide variation is not known. This chapter 
investigates the implications of convexification and uncertain budget constraints on labor 
supply estimates. I consider a new version within Hausman’s framework to handle the 
uncertain budget sets. I introduce measurement error in nonlabor income. Particularly, I 
assume that individuals know their incomes well. But econometricians do not have 
perfect knowledge about individual's nonlabor income. Uncertainty in nonlabor income 
leads to a random budget set for each individual, which seems to be precisely in line with 
comments in Heckman (1983). My empirical estimates demonstrate that variation in 
budget sets does not explain the different estimates of labor supply elasticity. But the 
budget constraints shift substantially if state individual income tax or social security tax 
is omitted. The bias in the level of budget constraints can cause the large variation of 
estimates.  
                                                 
12 Using different methodologies, three recent papers (Heim 2007, 2008 and Blau and Kahn 2007) also 
find smaller female wage elasticities in recent data.  
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation makes three main contributions to the explaining changes in 
female labor supply literature. First, it contributes to the econometric solution to explain 
changes in the participation rate of married women with preschool-aged children by 
proposing a new model to quantify contributions of various factors in previous literatures. 
A lot of possible factors are used to explain this growth in employment, but I focus on 
wage-gender gap, child care cost, spousal income, and commuting time with using 5% 
samples of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for 1980, 1990 and 
2000. After investigation, the change in the composition of married women with 
preschool-aged children drives the increase in labor force participation rate in the 1980s. 
But I can’t find a sensible conclusion, only 9.6% increase in the 1980s.  
Second, this dissertation introduces the concept of “career” to investigate. This 
new variable can measure the heterogeneity of females’ career work experience with 
using the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLSYW) from 1968 to 2003 
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) from 1979 to 2008. I 
further define career women and non-career women to analyze this observed interesting 
growth of the participation rate.  
Third, I figure out the changes in labor force participation rate are driven by shifts 
in the composition of married women or by changes in their preference. The increase in 
the female labor supply employment is very responsive to a wife’s career type before the 
first birth. My results show that the rising of the percentage of career women can explain 
30.33% of the growth across cohorts. Among the unexplained changes, the change in the 
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composition of career motivating career type women can at least explain 51.2%. That 
means it can at least explain 17.22% growth in the labor force participation rate across 
cohorts. 
To explain and address the discrepancies in estimates under structural models, I 
focus on the role of budget sets in producing the wide range of estimates. My 
contributions here are to study the effect of different ways of calculating budget 
constraints, typically such as convexification approximation of the non-convex budgets, 
and uncertain budget constraints. Intuitively, if leisure and consumption are near perfect 
substitutes, a minor difference in the convexification approximation will cause a large 
change in hours of work. First, I have investigated the effect of convexification 
approximation on the labor supply elasticities under both convexified and non-
convexified budget sets. 
 The second question I consider the uncertain budget constraint, which can’t be 
accurately measured in most cases because econometricians do not know the amount of 
tax payers’ itemized deduction. I introduce measurement error in nonlabor income. Such 
measurement error naturally shifts the intercept on the vertical axis of the budget 
constraints and changes the location of the kink points of the budget constraints. The 
slope of the budget sets is uncertain. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
of 1984 and 2001, I find that neither the convexification approximation nor using a model 
with random budget sets affects the estimates. These results demonstrate that variations 
in budget constraints alone do not explain the different estimates of labor supply 
elasticity. 
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Figure 1. The trend of Married Women Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The trend of Married Women Labor Force Participation Rate  
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Figure 3. The Trend of Child Care Workers’ Wage Rate from 1962 to 2010 
 
 
Figure 4. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
M
e
a
n
 V
a
lu
e
 o
f 
C
h
ild
 c
a
re
 W
o
rk
e
rs
' 
W
a
g
e
 R
a
te
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Leisure 
Income 
O 
A B 
C 
D 
  
66 
 
Figure 5. Convexification of a Budget Constraint 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE B1.1. Summary Statistics of IPUMS (1980-2000) 
 
5% samples of 
IPUMS for 1980 
5% samples of 
IPUMS for 1990 
5% samples of 
IPUMS for 2000 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Labor Force Participation 0.3882 0.4873 0.5420 0.4982 0.5329 0.4989 
Wage Ratio 0.7048 0.3575 0.7983 0.4017 0.8663 0.5046 
Child Cost ($) 8.1246 1.0148 7.8265 0.9635 8.8239 0.7970 
Nonlabor Income($10000) 3.7325 2.4230 4.3698 3.8356 5.1019 5.5233 
Commuting Time(10 Minutes) 2.2995 0.2583 2.3658 0.2288 2.7453 0.1874 
Age 28.3607 5.4757 30.2110 5.5800 31.4086 6.0257 
Age×Age/100 8.3431 3.3477 9.4384 3.5450 10.2281 3.9029 
Years of Education 12.3909 2.7368 12.9542 2.6577 13.2192 2.9063 
Central City Dummy 0.1739 0.3790 0.1268 0.3328 0.1297 0.3360 
Mortgage Dummy 0.4883 0.4999 0.5814 0.4933 0.6223 0.4848 
Actual Wage Rate 9.8399 5.5579 11.6472 7.1732 13.4196 9.2292 
# Observations 490552  499297  453786  
 
  
6
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TABLE B1. 2. The Change of Commuting Time and LF participation Rate across MSA (1980-2000) 
 5% samples of IPUMS for 1980 
 # observations Percentage 
Commuting 
Time Male 
LFP 
Rate 
LFP Rate 
No Child 
LFP Rate 
School-aged 
children 
LFP Rate 
Preschool-aged 
children Δ Time Δ LFPR 
Total 2088458   52.2%      
Non Big MSA 1170000 56.0% 20.79 51.2% 54.6% 55.7% 38.8%   
Big MSA 918458 44.0% 26.02 53.4% 59.7% 55.9% 38.8%   
 5% samples of IPUMS for 1990 
Total 2172046   63.1%     10.9% 
Non Big MSA 1276682 58.8% 21.70 62.5% 60.5% 68.5% 54.4% 0.91 11.3% 
Big MSA 895364 41.2% 26.33 64.0% 66.7% 67.4% 53.9% 0.31 10.6% 
 5% samples of IPUMS for 2000 
Total 2175973   62.7%     -0.4% 
Non Big MSA 1240121 57.0% 25.71 63.2% 60.4% 70.0% 54.9% 4.01 0.7% 
Big MSA 935852 43.0% 29.47 62.0% 64.2% 65.9% 51.4% 3.14 -2.0% 
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TABLE B1.3. Estimating the Participation Equation of Married Women  
with Preschool-aged Children  
(Dependent Variable = Wife’s Employment Dummy, 1980-2000) 
 Estimation Marginal Effect 
 Model (2.1) Model (2.2) Model (2.1) Model (2.2) 
Year=1980 
-0.341*** -0.303*** -0.1349 -0.1201 
(-131.57) (-112.42)   
Year=2000 
-0.0467*** -0.0306*** -0.0186 -0.0122 
(-17.84) (-9.10)   
Wage Ratio 
 0.612***  0.244 
 (190.96)   
Child Cost ($) 
 -0.0371***  -0.0148 
 (-30.70)   
Nonlabor Income($10000) 
 -0.0562***  -0.0224 
 (-179.56)   
Commuting Time(10 
Minutes) 
 0.00843  0.0034 
 (1.64)   
Constant 
-1.378*** -1.352***   
(-64.55) (-54.45)   
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
70 
TABLE B1.3. Continued 
 Estimation Marginal Effect 
 Model (2.1) Model (2.2) Model (2.1) Model (2.2) 
Age 
0.0304*** 0.0185*** 0.0121 0.0074 
(21.86) (13.19)   
Age×Age/100 
-0.0498*** -0.0226*** -0.0199 -0.009 
(-22.84) (-10.27)   
Years of Education 
0.0731*** 0.0808*** 0.0291 0.0322 
(173.50) (183.81)   
Central City Dummy 
0.00952** -0.0211*** 0.0038 -0.0084 
(3.12) (-6.42)   
Mortgage Dummy 
0.153*** 0.188*** 0.0608 0.075 
(66.72) (79.65)   
              * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE B1. 4. Predicted Changes in the Participation Rate  
of Married Women with Preschool-aged Children 
 Model (2.1) Model (2.2) 
 1990-1980 2000-1990 1990-1980 2000-1990 
Wage Ratio   2.44% 1.71% 
Child Cost ($)   0.43% -1.47% 
Nonlabor Income($10000)   -1.43% -1.64% 
Commuting Time(10 Minutes)   0.02% 0.13% 
Age 0.07% -0.14% 0.39% 0.17% 
Years of Education 1.63% 0.79% 1.80% 0.87% 
Central City Dummy -0.02% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 
Mortgage Dummy 0.55% 0.24% 0.68% 0.30% 
Total Explained 2.23% 0.89% 4.75% 0.24% 
Total Actual Change 0.1538 -0.0090 0.1538 -0.0090 
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TABLE B1. 5. % of Married women with school aged child  
who Work more than X% during three years before the first birth 
Education 
Group and 
Birth Years 
X 
# 
Observations 10 30 50 70 90 
0-16+ years       
1943-53 66.38% 55.47% 46.10% 33.87% 20.42% 2796 
1957-64 89.01% 81.22% 72.60% 60.85% 43.32% 2876 
Grade 11 or Less      
1943-53 40.64% 28.00% 21.12% 12.56% 6.72% 1250 
1957-64 70.99% 57.53% 46.54% 31.73% 17.78% 810 
Grade 12       
1943-53 83.76% 72.82% 60.27% 43.30% 27.18% 813 
1957-64 94.46% 86.34% 75.98% 63.86% 44.87% 974 
Some College       
1943-53 86.71% 76.81% 65.22% 52.42% 31.64% 414 
1957-64 97.09% 92.73% 85.61% 74.56% 54.65% 688 
College       
1943-53 96.55% 91.22% 83.07% 69.28% 42.32% 319 
1957-64 98.27% 96.78% 94.55% 88.61% 71.53% 404 
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TABLE B1. 6. % of Married women with school aged child  
who Work more than X% during three years after the first birth 
Education Group 
and Birth Years 
X # 
Observations 10 30 50 70 90 
0-16+ years       
1943-53 76.36% 58.76% 45.64% 31.87% 17.17% 2796 
1957-64 84.42% 71.77% 57.61% 44.23% 26.81% 2876 
Grade 11 or Less     
1943-53 70.24% 50.64% 37.28% 23.60% 10.88% 1250 
1957-64 79.51% 60.37% 42.10% 28.52% 12.96% 810 
Grade 12       
1943-53 80.69% 63.84% 46.99% 32.72% 17.84% 813 
1957-64 86.55% 74.64% 61.19% 46.41% 26.18% 974 
Some College       
1943-53 80.19% 65.46% 56.28% 40.82% 23.43% 414 
1957-64 86.92% 78.34% 66.28% 52.91% 35.90% 688 
College       
1943-53 84.33% 68.97% 61.13% 50.47% 31.97% 319 
1957-64 84.90% 76.49% 65.35% 55.69% 40.59% 404 
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TABLE B1.7. The Frequencies of Career Type  
and LF Employment Type across cohorts 
Career Before Birth \ LFP After Birth 
Cohort 1943-53  Cohort 1957-64 
<0.5 >=0.5 Total <0.5 >=0.5 Total 
Non Career 
Type 
# Observations 994 513 1,507 502 286 788 
percentage 35.55 18.35 53.9 17.45 9.94 27.4 
Career Type 
# Observations 526 763 1,289 717 1,371 2,088 
percentage 18.81 27.29 46.1 24.93 47.67 72.6 
Total 
# Observations 1,520 1,276 2,796 1219 1,657 2,876 
percentage 54.36 45.64 100 42.39 57.61 100 
 
 
 
TABLE B1.8. The First Birth  
and Marriage age across Career Type across cohorts 
Career Before Birth \ LFP 
After Birth 
Cohort 1943-53 Cohort 1957-64 
<0.5 >=0.5 Total <0.5 >=0.5 Total 
Age at 
First 
Birth 
Non Career 
Type 21 20.9 21.2 22 20.9 21.4 
Career Type 25 26.6 26 26 26.2 26.1 
Age at 
First 
Marriage 
Non Career 
Type 20 20.5 20.3 21 21.2 21.2 
Career Type 23 23.5 23.2 23 23.4 23.2 
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TABLE B1.9. Summary Statistics of NLSYW and NLSY79 
 NLSYW NLSY79 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.4587 0.3537 0.5675 0.3529 
Career Type 0.4610 0.4986 0.7260 0.4461 
Career Type × Work Attitude 0.2507 0.4335 0.4833 0.4998 
Wage Ratio 2.0944 1.4757 2.5499 1.4632 
Nonlabor Income ($10000) 3.5721 1.8085 3.7878 3.0144 
Years of Education 13.5107 2.3413 13.7726 2.4893 
Age at First Birth 23.4070 4.5932 24.8032 4.9918 
Age at First Birth × Age at First Birth /100 5.6898 2.3996 6.4011 2.6843 
Black 0.2085 0.4063 0.1638 0.3701 
Hispanic 0.0111 0.1047 0.1777 0.3823 
South 0.2901 0.4539 0.3355 0.4723 
# Observations 2796  2876  
 
TABLE B1.10. The Frequencies of Work Attitude Type  
and Career Type across cohorts 
Work Attitude\Career Type 
Cohort 1943-53 Cohort 1943-53 
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
0 
# Observations 810 588 1,398 343 698 1,041 
percentage 28.97 21.03 50 11.93 24.27 36.2 
1 
# Observations 697 701 1,398 445 1,390 1,835 
percentage 24.93 25.07 50 15.47 48.33 63.8 
Total 
# Observations 1,507 1,289 2,796 788 2,088 2,876 
percentage 53.9 46.1 100 27.4 72.6 100 
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TABLE B1.11. Estimates of the Wife’s Participation Equation  
with Career Rate across cohorts (Dependent Variable = Wife’s Employment Rate) 
 Model (2.3) Model (2.4) Model (2.5) Model (2.7) Model (2.8) 
Cohort=NLSY79 
0.0828*** 0.0761*** 0.0364*** -0.000503 -0.000916 
(8.74) (8.15) (3.93) (-0.03) (-0.06) 
Wage Ratio 
 0.0393*** 0.0297*** 0.0307*** 0.0292*** 
 (10.77) (8.33) (8.60) (8.22) 
Nonlabor Income($10000) 
 -0.0221*** -0.0214*** -0.0218*** -0.0219*** 
 (-11.27) (-11.31) (-11.52) (-11.60) 
Career Type 
  0.217***   
  (20.01)   
Career Type×(Cohort=NLSYW) 
   0.189*** 0.120*** 
   (13.74) (7.18) 
Career Type×(Cohort=NLSY79) 
   0.249*** 0.215*** 
   (17.09) (12.39) 
Career Type × (Cohort=NLSYW) × 
Work Attitude 
    0.132*** 
    (7.35) 
Career Type × (Cohort=NLSY79) × 
Work Attitude 
    0.0561*** 
    (3.77) 
Constant -0.338** -0.0930 0.590*** 0.596*** 0.609*** 
 (-3.23) (-0.88) (5.49) (5.55) (5.70) 
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TABLE B1.11. Continued 
 Model (2.3) Model (2.4) Model (2.5) Model (2.7) Model (2.8) 
Years of Education 
0.0247*** 0.0248*** 0.0252*** 0.0250*** 0.0232*** 
(12.02) (11.64) (12.25) (12.15) (11.25) 
Age at First Birth 
0.0252** 0.00815 -0.0457*** -0.0451*** -0.0441*** 
(3.06) (0.99) (-5.42) (-5.35) (-5.27) 
Age at First Birth × Age at First 
Birth/100 
-0.0302* -0.00278 0.0831*** 0.0819*** 0.0804*** 
(-1.96) (-0.18) (5.40) (5.33) (5.26) 
Black 
0.131*** 0.118*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.130*** 
(10.76) (9.78) (11.26) (11.30) (11.23) 
Hispanic 
0.0549*** 0.0413** 0.0498** 0.0518*** 0.0534*** 
(3.40) (2.60) (3.24) (3.38) (3.49) 
South 
0.0559*** 0.0457*** 0.0381*** 0.0393*** 0.0426*** 
(5.61) (4.66) (4.02) (4.14) (4.51) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE B1.12. Predicted Changes in Wife’s Participation Rate  
with Career Rate across cohorts 
Variable Model (2.3) Model (2.4) Model (2.5) Model (2.7) Model (2.8) 
Career 
Type×(Cohort=NLSYW)   -0.1000 -0.0871 -0.0553 
Career 
Type×(Cohort=NLSY79)   0.1575 0.1808 0.1561 
Career Type × 
(Cohort=NLSYW) × Work 
Attitude     -0.0331 
Career Type × 
(Cohort=NLSY79) × Work 
Attitude     0.0271 
Wage Ratio  0.0179 0.0135 0.0140 0.0133 
Nonlabor Income ($10000)  -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0047 
Years of Education 0.0065 0.0065 0.0066 0.0065 0.0061 
Age at First Birth 0.0137 0.0094 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0044 
Black -0.0059 -0.0053 -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0058 
Hispanic 0.0091 0.0069 0.0083 0.0086 0.0089 
South 0.0025 0.0021 0.0017 0.0018 0.0019 
Total Explained Change 0.0260 0.0327 0.0724 0.1093 0.1101 
Total Actual Change 0.1088 
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TABLE B2.1. Summary of budget segments 
 Budget Segment 1 Budget Segment j > 1 
function for after-
tax income y
a
 
y
a
 =  y
n
 + w(1 - t1)h y
a
 =  y
a
j-1 + w(1 - tj)(h - Hj-1) 
kink points for 
after-tax income y
a
 
y0
a 
=   y
n
 y
a
j =  y
a
j-1 + w(1 - tj)(Hj - Hj-1) 
kink points for 
working hours h 
H0 = 0                                 
H1 = (Y1 – Y
n
)/w 
Hj = (Yj - Y
n
)/w 
virtual income y  1y  = y
n
 jy = 1jy   + w(tj - tj-1)Hj-1 
This TABLE B2.1. is reproduced from Fullerton and Gan (2001). 
I define t1 as the first bracket applied to labor income of this person 
(after taxation of nonlabor income). Using the person's nonlabor income, 
tj and Yj are also individual-specific, but can be found from the tax table 
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TABLE B2.2. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates 
1983 2000 
Tax Brackets Rates Tax Brackets Rates 
$0-$3,400  0 $0-$7,350  0 
$3,400-$5,500  0.11 $7,350-$51,200  0.15 
$5,500-$7,600  0.13 $51,200-$113,300  0.28 
$7,600-$11,900  0.15 $113,300-$168,800  0.31 
$11,900-$16,000  0.17 $168,800-$295,700  0.36 
$16,000-$20,200  0.19 $295,700+  0.396 
$20,200-$24,600  0.23   
$24,600-$29,900  0.26   
$29,900-$35,200  0.3   
$35,200-$45,800  0.35   
$45,800-$60,000  0.4   
$60,000-$85,600  0.44   
$85,600-$109,400  0.48   
$109,400+ 0.5     
 
TABLE B2.3. Earned Income Credit Parameters 
Calendar Year 
Credit Rate 
(Percent) 
Minimum 
income for 
maximum 
credit 
Maximum 
Credit 
Phase-out 
Rate 
(Percent) 
Phase-out Range 
Beginning 
Income 
Ending 
Income 
1983 10 5,000 500 12.5 6,000 10,000 
2000       
No Children 7.65 4,610 353 7.65 5,770 10,380 
One Child 34 6,920 2,353 15.98 12,690 27,413 
Two Children 40 9,720 3,888 21.06 12,690 31,152 
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TABLE B2.4. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name 
PSID 1984 PSID 2001 
Full Sample Working Women Full Sample Working Women 
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Unearned Income($) 29374.56 16898.80 27465.77 14407.24 62392.00 53478.30 61074.50 54744.20 
Hours of Work 1065.50 880.14 1451.07 703.65 1439.98 861.04 1711.90 644.65 
Hourly earnings 7.33 3.96 7.62 4.50 15.76 9.48 16.25 10.14 
Yearly Income 8139.82 8426.19 11085.35 8002.02 23820.82 21738.20 28319.00 20841.30 
Children(0-5) 0.55 0.75 0.49 0.71 0.31 0.46 0.27 0.45 
Children(6-18) 0.98 1.05 0.92 1.04 1.24 1.12 1.17 1.10 
Age 35.28 7.60 34.95 7.51 39.76 7.95 39.97 8.03 
Education(years) 12.89 2.06 13.02 2.10 13.74 2.05 13.82 2.00 
Health 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.23 
Housing 0.80 0.40 0.78 0.41 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.34 
Mortgage($) 5.05 3.45 5.04 3.45 9211.70 9677.17 9318.43 8857.07 
Sample Size 1050  771  1171  985  
Participation Rate 73.43%    84.12%    
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TABLE B2.5. Estimation Results under Federal Tax System, PSID 1984 
 (Dependent Variable: Wife's annual hours of work in 1000 hours) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
  
Dual Additive 
Errors Model (1) 
Nest Model 
(1) & (2) 
Random Income 
Coefficient Model (2) 
MENLI (3) 
MENLI MU 
(4) 
constant 1.53*** 1.52*** 1.44*** 2.22*** 2.28*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) 
wage (in $) 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.027*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.0088) 
nonlabor income (in $1000) -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0021) 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.0097) 
σ ε1 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.018*** 8.03*** 7.098*** 
 (0.059) (0.065) (0.0021) (0.47) (0.40) 
σ u 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.89*** 0.76*** 0.70*** 
 (0.07) (0.065) (0.029) (0.03) (0.020) 
μ1     -3.67*** 
     (0.40) 
λ  0.0025***    
  (0.00016)    
log-likelihood -1446.65 -1446.39 -1458.67 -1444.51 -1414.07 
uncompensated elasticity 0.34  0.29 0.22 0.13 
compensated elasticity 0.46   0.41 0.31 0.22 
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TABLE B2.5. Continued 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
  
Dual Additive 
Errors Model (1) 
Nest Model 
(1) & (2) 
Random Income 
Coefficient Model (2) 
MENLI (3) 
MENLI MU 
(4) 
# kids in age 0-5 -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.49*** -0.46*** -0.41*** 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.035) (0.034) (0.031) 
# kids in age 6-18 -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.13*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) 
age -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.01*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0032) 
education (in years) 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.0039 -0.0006 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) 
bad health -0.20 -0.19 -0.17 -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.087) 
house (dummy) -0.21* -0.21*** -0.20* -0.15* -0.11 
 (0.11) (0.099) (0.11) (0.087) (0.079) 
mortgage(in $ 1000) 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.0097) 
 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
                           * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE B2.6. Estimation Results under the U.S. Individual Income Tax System, 
PSID 1984  
(Dependent Variable: Wife's annual hours of work in hour) 
 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
  
Dual Additive 
Errors Model 
(1) 
Nest Model 
(1) & (2) 
Random 
Income 
Coefficient 
Model (2) 
MENLI (3) 
MENLI MU 
(4) 
σ ε1 361.90*** 0.0070*** 0.0027*** 844.08*** 848.87*** 
 (18.93) (0.0004) (0.0005) (141) (174.09) 
σ ε2    87.91*** 35.96 
    (31.7) (17167.24) 
σ u 836.39*** 1020.03*** 1029.91*** 1035.03*** 1031.27*** 
 (29.76) (37.09) (37.61) (38.11) (39.21) 
μ1     0.0035 
     (2.83) 
μ2     0.0021 
     (1.33) 
λ  0.497***    
  (0.00085)    
log-likelihood -6726.9 -6696.83 -6697.86 -6692.65 -6692.26 
uncompensated elasticity 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.25 
compensated elasticity 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.30 
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TABLE B2.6. Continued 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
  
Dual Additive 
Errors Model (1) 
Nest Model (1) & 
(2) 
Random Income 
Coefficient Model 
(2) 
MENLI (3) MENLI MU (4) 
constant 1449.19*** 1459.02*** 1154.45*** 1419.72*** 1400.42*** 
 (8.24) (19.51) (21.84) (26.19) (142.64) 
wage (in $) 62.35*** 65.00*** 65.17*** 77.70*** 78.46*** 
 (12.67) (1.11) (17.54) (12.97) (17.36) 
nonlabor income (in $) -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
# kids in age 0-5 -336.89*** -349.04*** -321.19*** -291.33*** -296.62*** 
 (33.94) (43.76) (46.39) (29.18) (39.33) 
# kids in age 6-18 -127.03*** -125.27*** -144.26*** -119.24*** -108.06*** 
 (23.03) (22.41) (3.80) (24.77) (16.46) 
age -10.97*** -15.44*** -2.56*** -17.38*** -17.29*** 
 (2.24) (2.90) (1.07) (2.79) (4.38) 
education (in years) 26.14*** 26.41*** 17.17 27.60*** 28.04*** 
 (7.04) (7.97) (10.42) (6.57) (12.05) 
bad health -209.46* -292.93*** -187.80 -232.87*** -242.22* 
 (107.55) (128.29) (128.94) (6.1) (138.75) 
house (dummy) -211.18*** -89.20*** -259.46*** -92.21*** -113.70*** 
 (36.97) (11.56) (86.38) (34.57) (56.58) 
mortgage(in $ 1000) 30.48*** 22.43*** 45.91*** 23.37*** 26.36*** 
 (5.91) (6.74) (1.35) (7.13) (11.11) 
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TABLE B2.6. Continued 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
  
Dual Additive 
Errors Model 
(1) 
Nest Model 
(1) & (2) 
Random 
Income 
Coefficient 
Model (2) 
MENLI (3) 
MENLI MU 
(4) 
Notes: 
     Standard errors in parentheses 
     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
In MENLI model or MENLI MU model: 
(1) σ ε1 is the standard deviation of error term ε1, which is the measurement error in husband labor income 
(2) σ ε2 is the standard deviation of error term ε 2, which is the measurement error in asset income 
(3) σ u is the standard deviation of error term u, which is the measurement error in working hours 
(4) μ1 is the mean of error term μ1 
(5) μ2 is the mean of error term μ 2 
In dual additive errors model or Hausman random coefficient model:  
(1) σ ε1 is the standard deviation of error term ε, which is the heterogeneity error in labor supply function 
(2) σ u is the standard deviation of error term u, which is the measurement error in working hours 
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TABLE B2.7. Estimation Results with the Convexified U.S. Individual Income Tax System, PSID 1984 
(Dependent Variable: Wife's annual hours of work in hour) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
  
Dual Additive 
Errors Model (1) 
Nest Model (1) 
& (2) 
Random Income 
Coefficient Model (2) 
constant 1100.95*** 1274.12*** 1282.37*** 
 (105.39) (235.96) (19.40) 
wage (in $) 54.75*** 55.55*** 60.55*** 
 (12.51) (17.45) (16.57) 
nonlabor income (in $) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.0017) (0.003) (0.0029) 
# kids in age 0-5 -341.35*** -345.26*** -351.01*** 
 (33.21) (48.16) (49.64) 
# kids in age 6-18 -110.24*** -103.25*** -110.23*** 
 (27.95) (29.22) (30.57) 
age -11.05*** -14.04*** -13.92*** 
 (2.69) (5.06) (4.16) 
education (in years) 47.32*** 37.04*** 36.81*** 
 (9.55) (16.70) (12.37) 
bad health -149.18 -206.79*** -216.78 
 (105.97) (59.64) (135.38) 
house (dummy) -277.84*** -140.51 -163.92 
 (124.65) (122.24) (120.68) 
mortgage(in $ 1000) 34.97*** 26.04* 27.63* 
 (13.93) (14.39) (14.38) 
σ ε1 57.35*** 0.0038 0.002 
 (14.31) (0.0024) (0.008) 
σ ε2    
    
σ u 1028.63*** 1015.32*** 1017.7*** 
 (38.67) (39.71) (38.66) 
λ  0.497  
  (0.71)  
log-likelihood -6689.55 -6691.12 -6691.22 
uncompensated elasticity 0.17 0.18 0.19 
compensated elasticity 0.22 0.23 0.24 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE B2.8. Estimation Results with the U.S. Individual Income Tax System, PSID 2001 
(Dependent Variable: Wife's annual hours of work in hour) 
 Nonconvexification of a Budget constraint Convexification  
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
  
Dual 
Additive 
Errors 
Model 
Random Income 
Coefficient 
Model 
MENLI 
Dual 
Additive 
Errors Model 
Random Income 
Coefficient 
Model 
constant 1260.81*** 1267.69*** 1477.96*** 1176.21** 1202.56 
 (0.13) (20.86) (6.52) (541.31) (22685.2) 
wage (in $) 21.48*** 18.52*** 17.013*** 21.46*** 21.77*** 
 (6.66) (6.62) (6.31) (5.66) (5.58) 
nonlabor income 
(in $) 
-0.0045*** -0.0065*** -0.0021** -0.0023** -0.0061*** 
 (0.00076) (0.00097) (0.00089) (0.001) (0.0011) 
kids in age 0-5 
(dummy) 
-416.86*** -440.14*** -440.39*** -411.80*** -410.83*** 
 (1.36) (49.80) (71.91) (66.45) (72.10) 
# children -134.32*** -127.43*** -142.14*** -126.12*** -122.90*** 
 (23.39) (24.74) (27.22) (26.65) (26.37) 
age -4.11*** -1.90*** -6.63* -0.60 0.13 
 (1.40) (0.65) (3.50) (2.29) (4.44) 
education (in 
years) 
23.96*** 28.62*** 15.96 16.11 23.14 
 (5.60) (7.42) (11.87) (14.25) (15.15) 
bad health -246.3** -498.96*** -450.16*** -466.01*** -525.83*** 
 (96.96) (56.46) (100.86) (99.21) (95.40) 
house (dummy) 349.74*** 244.45*** 221.67*** 240.10*** 234.61*** 
 (72.53) (73.26) (80.05) (77.83) (75.94) 
mortgage(in $ 
1000) 
0.0013 0.0041** 0.0035 0.00047 0.0053 
 (0.0030) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.003) (0.0032) 
σ ε 0.000065 0.0030*** 42818.82*** 0.055 0.0035 
 (3058.12) (0.00017) (159.69) (39028.05) (1518840) 
σ u 928.05*** 907.38*** 921.47*** 920.32*** 890.16*** 
 (19.42) (19.44) (22.58) (22.39) (20.98) 
log-likelihood 8347.13 8342.00 8345.78 8337.86 8329.84 
uncompensated 
elasticity 
0.13 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 
compensated 
elasticity 
0.17 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.19 
               Standard errors in parentheses 
        * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX C  
This appendix provides the procedure used to impute wages for wives. TABLEs 
C1, C2, and C3 show results from the 5% samples IPUMS for 1980, 1990, and 2000, 
respectively. Results of imputing wives’ wage rate in the NLSYW and NLSY79 are 
presented in TABLE C4 and C5, respectively.  
I follow Triest’s (1990) procedure to apply Heckman’s (1979) technique to 
correct the sample selection bias. The second column shows results from male’s wage 
regression model. I restrict male sample to those males who are married, healthy, non-
self-employment and 18-65 years old. The fourth column in TABLE C1, C2, and C3 
presents the results of the first step, which estimates a reduced form probit equation for 
wives’ labor market participation. I use age and age square, years of education, spousal 
income, the wage rate of child care workers, indicator for paying mortgage, living in the 
big MSA and central city. Results of wives’ wage imputation regression are shown in the 
sixth column of TABLEs C1, C2, and C3. Following the same empirical strategy, the 
second column in TABLE C4 and C5 presents the results of the first step, which 
estimates a reduced form probit equation for wives’ labor market participation. I use age 
at the first birth and age square, years of education, spousal income, and indicator for 
marriage and race. Results of wives’ wage imputation regression are shown in the fourth 
column of TABLEs C4 and C5. 
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TABLE C1. Imputation of Wives’ Wage Rate (IPUMS 1980) 
Wives' Wage Imputation with Male 
Model Probit: Wives' Labor Force Participation Wives' Wage Imputation Regression 
College Dummy 
0.0772*** 
Age 
0.0601*** 
College Dummy 
0.0843*** 
(38.87) (116.91) (32.19) 
Age 
0.00206*** 
Big MSA Dummy 
0.0199*** 
Age 
0.00993*** 
(19.13) (10.29) (55.79) 
Years of Education 
× Years of 
Education /10 
0.00477*** 
Central City Dummy 
0.0755*** 
Years of Education × 
Years of Education/10 
0.0223*** 
(22.96) (30.66) (74.89) 
Age × Years of 
Education/10 
0.00818*** 
Age × Age/100 
-0.0811*** Age × Years of 
Education/10 
-0.00255*** 
(95.86) (-130.83) (-18.84) 
Big MSA Dummy 
0.135*** 
Years of Education 
0.0620*** 
Big MSA Dummy 
0.108*** 
(149.31) (191.85) (98.01) 
Central City 
Dummy 
-0.0792*** Nonlabor Income 
($10000) 
-0.000204*** 
Central City Dummy 
0.0142*** 
(-67.69) (-14.93) (9.92) 
  
Child Care Cost 
-0.0208*** 
Inverse Mills' Ratio 
-0.370*** 
  (-22.82) (-59.37) 
  
Mortgage Dummy 
0.0790***   
  (42.66)   
Constant 
2.131*** 
Constant 
-1.640*** 
Constant 
1.871*** 
(611.36) (-130.46) (267.16) 
R2 0.1513 Log Likelihood -1402418.7 R2 0.137 
# Observations 1703227 # Observations 2088458 # Observations 1025315 
              * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1% 
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TABLE C2. Imputation of Wives’ Wage Rate (IPUMS 1990) 
Wives' Wage Imputation with Male 
Model Probit: Wives' Labor Force Participation Wives' Wage Imputation Regression 
College Dummy 
0.00132 
Age  
0.107*** 
College Dummy 
-0.00297 
(0.67) (195.44) (-1.26) 
Age 
0.00985*** 
Big MSA Dummy 
-0.00204 
Age 
0.0193*** 
(79.02) (-1.05) (102.35) 
Years of 
Education × Years 
of Education/10 
0.0273*** 
Central City Dummy 
0.0237*** 
Years of Education × 
Years of Education/10 
0.0442*** 
(113.86) (8.09) (141.43) 
Age × Years of 
Education/10 
0.00211*** 
Age × Age/100 
-0.140*** Age × Years of 
Education/10 
-0.00915*** 
(21.94) (-217.74) (-64.88) 
Big MSA Dummy 
0.169*** 
Years of Education 
0.0784*** 
Big MSA Dummy 
0.173*** 
(193.57) (225.52) (178.45) 
Central City 
Dummy 
-0.0842*** Nonlabor Income 
($10000) 
-0.000675e*** 
Central City Dummy 
0.0341*** 
(-63.72) (-34.73) (22.82) 
  
Child Care Cost 
-0.0162*** 
Inverse Mills' Ratio 
-0.422*** 
  (-17.02) (-119.81) 
  
Mortgage Dummy 
0.196***   
  (104.33)   
Constant 
1.720*** 
Constant 
-2.546*** 
Constant 
1.488*** 
(423.91) (-191.00) (260.89) 
R2 0.2139 Log Likelihood -1361228.2 R2 0.2148 
# Observations 1783183 # Observations 2172046 # Observations 1315153 
              * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1% 
 
 
 
 
  
92 
TABLE C3. Imputation of Wives’ Wage Rate (IPUMS 2000) 
Wives' Wage Imputation with Male 
Model Probit: Wives' Labor Force Participation Wives' Wage Imputation Regression 
College Dummy 
-0.00644** 
Age  
0.0843*** 
College Dummy 
0.0313*** 
(-3.14) (145.20) (14.08) 
Age 
0.0112*** 
Big MSA Dummy 
-0.0974*** 
Age 
0.0240*** 
(79.38) (-49.33) (128.52) 
Years of 
Education × 
Years of 
Education/10 
0.0319*** 
Central City 
Dummy 
-0.0549*** 
Years of Education × 
Years of Education/10 
0.0398*** 
(125.15) (-18.60) (135.26) 
Age × Years of 
Education/10 
-0.0000694 
Age × Age/100 
-0.117*** Age × Years of 
Education/10 
-0.00918*** 
(-0.66) (-174.10) (-68.76) 
Big MSA 
Dummy 
0.134*** 
Years of Education 
0.0813*** 
Big MSA Dummy 
0.189*** 
(153.08) (241.55) (201.46) 
Central City 
Dummy 
-0.0699*** Nonlabor Income 
($10000) 
0.000141*** 
Central City Dummy 
0.0460*** 
(-51.48) (14.56) (31.33) 
  
Child Care Cost 
-0.0260*** 
Inverse Mills' Ratio 
-0.677*** 
  (-21.28) (-163.42) 
  
Mortgage Dummy 
0.238***   
  (120.82)   
Constant 
1.696*** 
Constant 
-1.676*** 
Constant 
1.472*** 
(386.25) (-106.32) (276.05) 
R2 0.2047 Log Likelihood -1220083.6 R2  0.2262 
# Observations 1691056 # Observations 2175973 # Observations 1539688 
              * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1% 
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TABLE C4. Imputation of Wives’ Actual Wage Rate (NLSYW) 
Probit: Wives' Labor Force Participation Wives' Wage Imputation Regression 
Age at First Birth 
0.558*** College Educated 
Dummy 
-0.0907* 
(11.76) (-1.99) 
Age at First Birth × Age 
at First Birth/100 
-0.888*** 
Age at First Birth 
-0.00470 
(-9.93) (-0.26) 
Years of Education 
0.0293* Years of Education × 
Years of Education/10 
-0.0102 
(2.42) (-0.91) 
Nonlabor 
Income($10000) 
-0.0315* Age at First Birth × 
Years of Education/10 
0.0378** 
(-2.11) (3.15) 
Black Dummy 
0.154* 
Black Dummy 
-0.0131 
(2.42) (-0.47) 
Hispanic Dummy 
-0.297 
Hispanic Dummy 
-0.0465 
(-1.26) (-0.43) 
Marriage Dummy 
-0.500*** 
Inverse Mills' Ratio 
0.000849 
(-6.93) (0.01) 
Constant 
-7.849*** 
Constant 
0.343 
(-13.33) (0.57) 
Log Likelihood -1813.5363 R
2
  0.3075 
# Observations 2949 # Observations 1515 
  Including Year Dummy 1960-1993 
              * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1% 
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TABLE C5. Imputation of Wives’ Actual Wage Rate (NLSY79) 
 
                      * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1% 
 
Probit: Wives’ Labor Force Participation Wives’ Wage Imputation Regression 
Age at First Birth 
0.225*** College Educated 
Dummy 
-0.132** 
(4.84) (-2.64) 
Age at First Birth × Age at 
First Birth/100 
-0.311*** 
Age at First Birth 
0.0195 
(-3.61) (1.14) 
Years of Education 
0.0664*** Years of Education × 
Years of Education/10 
-0.00148 
(5.49) (-0.15) 
Nonlabor Income($10000) 
-0.0325*** Age at First Birth × Years 
of Education/10 
0.0404*** 
(-3.54) (4.07) 
Black Dummy 
0.0508 
Black Dummy 
-0.0608* 
(0.68) (-2.01) 
Hispanic Dummy 
-0.0387 
Hispanic Dummy 
0.00575 
(-0.58) (0.19) 
Marriage Dummy 
0.00822 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
1.080*** 
(0.11) (5.57) 
Constant 
-3.920*** 
Constant 
-0.739 
(-6.50) (-1.05) 
Log Likelihood -1594.2002 R
2
 0.4141 
# Observations 2704 # Observations 1830 
  Including Year Dummy 1975-2005 
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APPENDIX D  
 
This appendix provides the procedure used to impute wages for wives. TABLE 
D1 shows results from the PSID of 1984. Results of imputing wives’ wage rate in the 
PSID of 2001 are presented in TABLE D2. I follow Triest’s (1990) procedure to apply 
Heckman’s (1979) technique to correct the sample selection bias. The second column in 
TABLE D1 and D2 presents the results of the first step, which estimates a reduced form 
probit equation for wives’ labor market participation. Different from Triest (1990), I use 
the number of education years, instead of a dummy variable. And a variable is equal to 
individuals’ age minus 35 for women less than 35 and equal to age minus 25 for those 
over 35. Results of wives’ wage imputation regression are shown in the fourth column of 
TABLEs D1 and D2. 
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TABLE D1. Imputation of Wives’ Wage Rates (PSID 1984) 
Reduced Form Probit: Wives' Labor Force 
Participation  
Wives' Wage Imputation 
Regression  
Constant -0.43 Constant 0.67 
 (0.45)  (0.43) 
# kids in age 0-5 -0.33*** College education -0.11 
 (0.071)  (0.098) 
Family Size -0.11*** Age - 35 0.0024 
 (0.042)  (0.0073) 
Age-35 0.031*** Age - 45 -0.010 
 (0.016)  (0.018) 
Age-45 -0.060*** Education 
2
/10 0.024 
 (0.025)  (0.015) 
Education (in years) 0.12*** (Education * Age)/10 0.014 
 (0.02)  (0.011) 
Nonlabor income (in $1) -.000018*** Bad Health 0.0022 
 (2.82e-06)  (0.089) 
Bad Health -0.21 Inverse Mills' ratio 0.11 
 (0.18)  (0.11) 
Log likelihood -552.16 R
2
 0.15 
# Observations 1050 # Observations 771 
            Standard errors in parentheses 
           * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE D2. Imputation of Wives’ Wage Rates (PSID 2001) 
Reduced Form Probit: Wives' Labor Force 
Participation  
Wives' Wage Imputation 
Regression  
Constant 0.31 Constant 2.35*** 
 (0.47)  (0.40) 
kids in age 0-5 (dummy) -.60*** College education -0.054 
 (0.13)  (0.061) 
Family Size -0.075* Age - 35 -0.005 
 (0.044)  (0.007) 
Age-35 0.002 Age - 45 0.034* 
 (0.018)  (0 .018) 
Age-45 -0.008 Education 
2
/10 0.063*** 
 (0.027)  (0.015) 
Education (in years) 0.097*** (Education * Age)/10 -0.012 
 (0.024)  (0.010) 
Nonlabor income (in $1) -2.37e-06*** Bad Health -0.014 
 (7.31e-07)  (0.083) 
Bad Health  -0.58 Inverse Mills' ratio -0.098 
 (0.16)  (0.15 ) 
Log likelihood -476.66 R
2
 0.15 
# Observations 1171 # Observations 985 
            Standard errors in parentheses 
           * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
  
98 
VITA 
 
Name: Xinrong Li 
 
Address:        3009 Allen, Department of Economics, TAMU, College Station,  
 TX 77843-4228  
 
Email Address: xli@econ.tamu.edu 
 
Education:        B.E., Computer Science, Beijing Jiaotong University, 2001 
        Ph.D., Economics, Texas A&M University, 2011 
 
 
